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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the Chinese reform era began in 1978, there have been 
significant changes in the nature and incidence of disputes, conflicts and 
social disturbances, and in the mechanisms for addressing them.  As with 
economic and governance reforms, the government has adopted a 
pragmatic, problem-solving approach in its attempts to meet the broad 
and at times conflicting goals of justice and efficiency while maintaining 
socio-political stability and rapid economic growth.  The result has been 
continuous experimentation leading to the creation of new mechanisms, 
the reform of existing mechanisms, and the return to older mechanisms 
in some cases when newer ones proved disappointing.  This is generally 
true across areas:  commercial disputes, constitutional and administrative 
law, socio-economic issues (pension, welfare and medical claims, labor 
disputes, land takings and environmental issues), criminal law, and civil 
and political rights.  However, reforms have been more active, progress 
has been more noticeable, and the path of reforms has been more 
consistent and direct in some areas than others. 
 We begin with a brief overview of significant developments in the 
handling of commercial disputes, socio-economic claims and public law 
(administrative and constitutional law) disputes.1  Three general patterns 
 
1  For developments in criminal law and administrative detention see generally 
JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW:  CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 261-98 (2008) (reviewing 
Chinese criminal code and advocating for comprehensive reform); ZHU JINGWEN, 
ZHONGGUO FA LÜ FA ZHAN BAO GAO:  SHU JU KU HE ZHI BIAO TI XI [REPORT ON CHINA 
DEVELOPMENT:  DATABASE AND INDICATORS] (2007); Chen Ruihua, Anjuan Bilu Zhongxin 
Zhuyi:  Zhongguo Xingshi Shenpan Fangshi De Zai Kaocha [On the Trial Mode Centered 
on Files and ;otes:  Reconsidering China’s Criminal Adjudication Process], FAXUE 
YANJIU [CHINESE J. L.], April 2006, 63 (arguing for reform in criminal evidentiary rules); 
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stand out:  first, the much better performance of institutions for handling 
disputes in urban areas compared to rural areas; second, the significantly 
greater progress in handling commercial law disputes compared to socio-
economic claims; and third, the more advanced state of administrative 
law compared to constitutional law.  We then summarize some of the key 
factors underlying these patterns and the dynamics of reform, providing 
an account of why the government has opted for a particular mix of 
mechanisms to handle a certain type of dispute at any given time, why 
that mix has changed over time, and why there has been more progress in 
some areas than other areas.  We conclude with some thoughts on what 
can be expected in the future, and some policy recommendations to help 
overcome some of the existing problems. 
 
II. COMMERCIAL LAW 
 
 Dispute resolution in the commercial area is characterized by:  (i) 
demonstrable overall progress; (ii) considerable efforts to improve the 
regulatory framework and respond to investors’ needs, thus reducing 
vertical disputes and tensions between businesses and the state; (iii) a 
rapid rise in litigation to resolve horizontal commercial disputes among 
business operators through the late 1990s followed by relative stability; 
(iv) improvements in enforcement, particularly in more developed urban 
areas; (v) notwithstanding the considerable progress, ongoing problems 
with litigation, including significant regional differences in the nature of 
the economy, the nature of disputes and institutional capacity, and (vi) a 
renewed emphasis on judicial mediation in response to ongoing problems. 
 
 
Chen Ruihua, Susong De Sili Hezuo Moshi: Xingshi Hejie Zai Zhongguo De Xingqi [On 
the Private Cooperation Model in Criminal Proceedings], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA 
LEGAL SCI.], Oct. 9, 2006, at 15 (discussing criminal settlement practice); Hualing Fu, 
Putting China’s Judiciary into Perspective:  Is It Independent, Competent, and Fair?, in 
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE:  EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 193, 194-
97 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (reviewing criminal law 
developments); Randall Peerenboom, Out of the Pan and into the Fire:  Well-Intentioned 
but Misguided Recommendations to Eliminate Administrative Detention in China, 98 NW. 
U. L. REV. 991 (2004) (arguing for reform rather than elimination of administrative 
detention in China).  For civil and political rights, see generally CONG.-EXECUTIVE 
COMM’N ON CHINA, 108TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter CECC 2004]; 
RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES:  THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE 
REST? 129-162 (2007) (assessing China’s performance with respect to human rights). 
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A. Improving the Business Environment:  Market-Friendly Regulations 
and Improved Governance 
 
 The importance of law and a functional legal system to economic 
development in Asia has often been overlooked because so much of the 
focus has been placed on the role of courts in enforcing contract rights.2  
However, equally if not more important is the creation of a business-
friendly environment, including market-friendly regulations and 
institutions capable of enforcing the regulations effectively and 
efficiently.3  The primary complaint of foreign investors has not been 
weak courts unable to enforce contractual rights but a lack of 
transparency in the making of laws and regulations, inconsistent 
implementation of laws, excessive red tape, and predatory government 
behavior.4  This has been clearly shown in many areas related to foreign 
 
2 See, e.g., Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis:  
The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 94-96 (2003) (“legal systems of developed 
capitalist economies do two important things:  they enforce contractual rights . . . and 
provide security for one’s property”); Donald Clarke et al.，The Role of Law in China’s 
Economic Development 1-21 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Public L. & Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 187, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=878672 (last visited May 10, 
2009) (discussing the role of contract rights in China’s economic development and 
finding court’s role secondary); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 
8 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Working Paper No. 30, 2002), available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009) (“the 
distaste for politics has led legal reformers to avoid it and to try to build legal systems 
outside of and in opposition to it, where property and contract rights are seamlessly 
enforced without reference to their political and social consequences”). 
3  Courts in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore generally 
handled commercial cases in an independent, fair and reasonable way during their 
periods of rapid growth, even though the courts in the last four did not provide much 
protection for civil and political rights under non-democratic regimes, and commercial 
litigation in Japan was limited by a variety of institutional factors, including institutional 
restraints such as jurisdictional rules and the size of the legal profession.  That courts 
were able to provide reasonable protection for commercial property rights if necessary 
enhanced the effectiveness of informal means of resolving disputes.  See PEERENBOOM, 
supra note 1, at 33-39 (discussing mutual reinforcement of rule of law and economic 
growth). 
4 Since 1999, foreign investors have cited as the four biggest challenges for doing 
business in China a lack of transparency (major challenge for 41% of respondents), 
inconsistent regulatory interpretation (37%), unclear regulations (34%), and excessive 
bureaucracy (31%), followed by human resource constraints (29%) and IP infringements 
(26%).  AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA & 
AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN SHANGHAI [hereinafter AMCHAM], 2007 WHITE 
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direct investment, such as which sectors are open to foreign investment 
and the levels of approvals needed for certain investment projects.5  In 
addition to these concerns, domestic businesses have complained about 
systematic biases against the private sector, including limitations on 
access to capital provided on soft loan terms to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs).6 
 The business environment is now considerably more favorable to 
both foreign and domestic investors.  Restrictions on foreign direct 
investment have been removed or relaxed in many areas.7  In addition to 
the Sino-foreign joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises, and 
wholly-owned foreign enterprises, there are new forms of investment.8  
These new forms include various ways of participating in China’s debt 
 
PAPER:  AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA 13 fig.4 (2007), available at http:// 
www.amchamchina.org/article/3185 (last visited May 10, 2009).  But almost 40% of 
investors believe there have been improvements in transparency between 2005 and 2007 
(versus 55% unchanged); 27% saw improvements in regulatory consistency (versus 63% 
unchanged), 34% thought regulations were clearer (versus 54% unchanged) and 37% felt 
the bureaucracy had improved (versus 60% unchanged).  Id. at 62 fig.21.  Looking 
forward, 33% cited a slowdown of the Chinese economy as the biggest risk for coming 
years, while 26% cited increased Chinese protectionism, 21% cited deterioration of Sino-
US relations, and 20% cited labor costs.  Id. at 13 fig.5.  However, 91% of respondents 
are either optimistic or cautiously optimistic in their five year outlooks for doing business 
in China, compared to only 5% who are pessimistic.  Id. at 65 fig.29. 
In predatory states, officials mainly utilize their position to extract unproductive 
rents from producers and entrepreneurs while not participating in business either directly 
or indirectly.  For a discussion of the predatory state, see generally Marc Blecher & 
Vivienne Shue, Into Leather:  State-led Development and the Private Sector in Xinji, 
2001 CHINA Q. 368, 368 n.1. 
5  See generally YASHENG HUANG, FDI IN CHINA:  AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 31-41 
(1998) (noting that China’s organizational uncertainties and decentralized but layered 
discretionary authority lead to inefficiencies in attracting FDI). 
6 See id. at 41 (noting excessive restrictions on domestic non-state-owned firms to 
compete for state-owned assets). 
7 Guiding Catalogue of Foreign-Invested Industries (2007) (promulgated jointly by 
Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n & Ministry of Com., Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 
2007), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009); see also China's 2007 Foreign 
Investment Guide, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 16, 16-17 (discussing how as a 
result of 2007 guidelines, “some industry sectors will see more support and openness, 
while other sectors will find ownership or other restrictions on new investments”). 
8  See generally, Yadong Luo & Min Chen, Financial Performance Comparison 
Between International Joint Ventures and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises in China, 
37 INT’L EXECUTIVE 599 (1995) (examining relative performance of international joint 
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises). 
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and equity markets, such as through Qualified Foreign Investment 
Institutions9 and RMB-denominated corporate debt issued in Hong Kong, 
and new types of business entities, including partnerships, franchises,10 
and branch offices.  The importance of the domestic private sector has 
been recognized and given a firm basis in the constitution.11  Institutions 
have been created to facilitate market activities, including the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), which oversees China’s 
stock markets, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which 
oversees the banking industry.12  The approval and licensing system has 
been overhauled as a result of State Council initiated reforms and the 
passage of the Licensing Law, 13  although most projects still require 
numerous licenses.  The recently passed Property Law, 14  Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law,15 and Anti-Monopoly Law16 have filled gaps in the 
regulatory framework.  The Legislation Law,17 China’s WTO accession 
agreement, 18  and other regulations have led to increased public 
participation in processes of making, interpreting and implementing laws 
and regulations.  There has been an increase in the number of public 
hearings and opportunities for public comment prior to the passage of 
key laws and regulations, a trend that will be further strengthened with 
 
9  See generally, Steven Yeo, The PRC Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
Market, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 443 (2003) (speculating as to affects that qualified foreign 
institutional investors will have on Chinese securities markets). 
10  See generally, Paul Jones, The Regulation of Franchising in China and the 
Development of a Civil Law Legal System, 2 CHINESE L. & POL’Y REV. 78 (2006) 
(discussing China franchising law). 
11 XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (protecting rights to private property). 
12  See generally Duncan Alford, The Influence of Hong Kong Banking Law on 
Banking Reform in the PRC, 3 E. ASIA L. REV. 35 (2008) (elaborating on influence of 
Hong Kong’s banking system on the development of Chinese banking law). 
13 Administrative License Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 
2003, effective July 1, 2004), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
14 Property Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective 
Oct. 1, 2007), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
15 Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 
2006, effective June 1, 2007), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
16 Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
17 Law on Legislation (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2000), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
18 Decision of the Ministerial Conference, Accession of the People's Republic of 
China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001). 
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the passage of the Administrative Procedure Law, currently being 
drafted.19 
 These changes are reflected in empirical surveys.  China ranked 
seventeenth out of 134 countries in the 2008-2009 World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. 20  For 2009, the World Bank 
ranked China eighty-third out of 181 countries for doing business 
overall.21  China has been one of the most open developing economies in 
the world.22  Its average tariff rate of 10% is much lower than that of 
Argentina (32%), Brazil (31%), India (50%) and Indonesia (37%).23  Its 
ratio of imports to GDP is almost 35%, compared to 9% for Japan.24  
China has also been more open, and relied more heavily on foreign direct 
investment, than South Korea, Japan or Taiwan.  In 2003, the ratio of the 
stock of foreign investment to GDP was 35% in China, compared to 8% 
 
19 China’s first public hearing on the proposed income tax changes was held in 2005.  
See China Opens Hearing On Income Tax Threshold, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 27, 2005, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/27/content_481213.htm 
(last visited May 10, 2009) (“More than 20 people from various walks of life and various 
regions across the country, selected from nearly 5,000 applicants,attended [sic] the 
hearing.  Their opinions will provide an ‘important basis’ for the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress (NPC), the top legislature, to make amendments to the 
personal income tax law.”). 
China also sought public comment on its draft Labor Contract Law in 2007.  See 
Zhongguo zai du kai men li fa gong bu lao dong ge tong fa cao an zheng qiu yi xian 
[Chinese Reopen Legislature’s Published Draft Labor Contract Law To Solicit Opinions], 
XINHUANET, Mar. 21. 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-
03/21/content_4325314.htm (last visited May 10, 2009).  There were thousands of public 
comments and suggestions.  See Lao dong he tong fa ca oan di er jie duan shou dao ge 
fang yi jian wan duo jian [Draft Labor Contract Law Second Phase Receives More Than 
30,000 Views], XINHUANET, Apr. 6, 2006, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2006-04/06/content_4392485.htm (last visited 
May 10, 2009). 
20 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2008-2009, 10 
tbl.4, 134-35 (2008) [hereinafter WEF]. The comparability of prior years’ results is 
mitigated by changes in methodology and by the number of countries surveyed. See id. at 
43-59 (describing and justifying new methodology). 
21 WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS 2009:  
COMPARING REGULATION IN 181 COUNTRIES 6 tbl.1.3, 97 (2008). 
22 Lee Branstetter & Nicholas Lardy, China’s Embrace of Globalization:  The Move 
to Freer Trade Prior to WTO Accession, ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPORT, July 2005, at 6, 
11-12. 
23 Id. at 12. 
24 Id. at 11 fig.6, 12. 
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in Korea, 5% in India and 2% in Japan.25  Reflecting the considerable 
investment in institution-building, China now outperforms the average in 
its income class on World Bank’s indexes for government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality and rule of law.26 
 At the same time, many problems remain.  Security markets are 
dominated by firms in which the state continues to hold a majority share, 
which has hampered the development of corporate governance and a 
legal regime to protect minority rights.27  Starting a business is time-
consuming and difficult, with numerous approvals and licenses required.  
Despite some improvements, including a recently passed freedom of 
information act,28 transparency of government policymaking remains an 
issue.29  Corruption also continues to be a problem, with China only 
slightly outperforming the average in its income class in 2006.30 
 Investors have relied mainly on lobbying to address these issues, 
arguing generally that reforms are in China’s own national interests 
(although administrative litigation and other mechanisms, discussed 
below, also provide disgruntled parties avenues for challenging 
government acts).  Lobbying by the business community is frequently 
combined with bilateral and multilateral pressure, although the two 
processes are not always in lock-step, as when members of the U.S. 
Congress publicly reprimanded the American Chamber of Commerce for 
opposing labor-friendly provisions of the 2007 Labor Contract Law.31 
 
25 Martin Wolf, Though Precedents are Ominous, China’s Rise to Greatness ;eed 
;ot Bring Conflict:  Prospects for Peace and Prosperity Between China and the US, FIN. 
TIMES (UK FIRST ED.), Sept. 15, 2005, at 17. 
26 See Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VI:  Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996-2006 13-14, 82-90 tbls. C3-C5 (World Bank Pol’y Res. 
Working Paper No. 4280, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999979 (last 
visited May 10, 2009) (giving tables of performance indicators in given categories). 
27 See WEF, supra note 20, at 26-28 and box 3 (discussing China’s growth and its 
relative weakness in the financial sector).  
28 Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information (promulgated by the St. 
Council Apr. 5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited 
May 10, 2009).  See also Zhao Huaxin, Statute to Make Gov’t Open, Clean, CHINA DAILY, 
Apr. 25, 2007, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-
04/25/content_858970.htm (last visited May 10, 2009) (discussing regulation). 
29 See WEF, supra note 20, at 135 (ranking China 46th out of 134 countries on 
transparency of government policymaking). 
30 Kaufman et al., supra note 26, at 13-14, 91-93 tbl. C6. 
31 Labour Contract Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, 
effective Jan. 1, 2008), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009); Tim Costello 
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 The Chinese government, for its part, has remained committed to 
market reforms, albeit with periods of indecision, most notably in 1989 
in the wake of the Tiananmen demonstrations and more recently when 
conservative factions argued that China’s open-door economic policies 
have led to rising income inequality, environmental degradation and a 
host of social ills from increased crime to rampant prostitution.  There 
are also signs that China’s leaders, now more acutely aware of the many 
ways in which rich countries erect trade barriers to protect their own 
national economies, are beginning to rethink China’s open door 
policies.32  At present, however, the general trend seems to be toward 
continued openness, albeit with limited retrenchment in some areas.33 
 Given the Chinese Communist Party’s dependence on economic 
growth as the mainstay of its claim to legitimacy, government leaders 
have had little choice but to press on with reforms.  In so doing, they 
have relied mainly on an incentive structure for promotion that places 
great weight on economic growth to ensure that local officials create a 
business-friendly environment.  At times, the incentive structure has 
worked too well, as lower-level officials ignore central policies or 
engage in protectionist measures to achieve local development.34 
 
B. General Trend Toward More Litigation 
 
 The transition to a market economy not only increases transactions 
but creates new property rights:  use rights in land and ownership rights 
in buildings; security interests in land, buildings and other property; 
 
et. al, Labor Rights in China, FPIF COMMENTARY, Dec. 21, 2006, available at 
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3824 (last visited May 10, 2009).  See also AMCHAM, supra 
note 4, at 36 (expressing concerns with some provisions of then draft Labor Contract 
Law). 
32 See MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG, AND 
TAIWAN 141 (2005) (comparing China’s protectionist policies to those of the United 
States during the Great Depression).  See generally id. at 93-220 (describing Chinese 
competition law policies through historical and political lens). 
33  See LESTER ROSS, THE ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA’S TRANSITION 
(n.d.), available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Ross_pb9%231%23.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2009) (discussing China’s technical compliance to WTO accession 
agreements, but continued use of protectionist measures).  See also AMCHAM, supra note 
4, at 24-30 (discussing improvements and new barriers to foreign investment). 
34 See HUANG, supra note 5, at 31 (noting ability of firms to bargain with local 
authorities over the enforcement of central policies). 
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rights of homeowner associations vis-à-vis developers and management 
companies; property interests in stocks and other securities; intellectual 
property rights; and rights to business licenses and to be free from 
government predation.  In some cases, the new rules alter or replace 
existing norms and rules, in the process transferring assets from less 
productive users to higher productive users.  One of the most 
conspicuous examples is through privatization, in which land use rights 
in rural areas have been allocated to individual households.35  In urban 
areas, many residents have been relocated in the process of transferring 
land to higher value users, leading to considerable conflict.  Many state-
owned enterprises have also been restructured and reformed.36  These 
new rights must be protected, often but by no means exclusively through 
litigation in the courts. 
 The general trend in the commercial area has been for an increase in 
litigation with an expansion of the range of justiciable disputes, while 
mediation has decreased and arbitration has remained relatively stable 
and limited.37  The number of first-instance economic cases increased 
from 44,080 in 1983 to 1,519,793 in 1996, while the number of first 
instance civil cases increased from 300,787 in 1978 to 3,519,244 in 
1999.38 
 Between 1983 and 2001, economic disputes increased an average of 
18.8% a year, an increase twice the rate of civil disputes, and four times 
the rate of criminal cases.39  Contract disputes are the major cause of 
litigation.40   First-instance purchase and sale contract cases increased 
from 23,482 in 1983 to 422,655 in 1996, and money-lending cases 
increased from 1,264 in 1983 to 558,499 in 1996.41 
 A number of procedural reforms have increased the efficiency and 
fairness of the process, including reforms of the case management 
 
35  Xin He, The Recent Decline in Economic Caseloads in Chinese Courts:  
Exploration of a Surprising Puzzle, 2007 CHINA Q. 352, 365. 
36 Id. at 366-67. 
37 ZHU, supra note 1, at 21-26. 
38 He, supra note 35, at 353 tbl.1. 
39 Clarke et al., supra note 2, at 40, 69 tbl.2. 
40 Id. at 40, 70 tbl.3. 
41 QUAN GUO REN MIN FA YUAN SI FA TONG JI LI SHI ZI LIAO HUI BIAN:  1949 - 1998 (MIN 
SHI BU FEN) [COLLECTION OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON NATION-WIDE PEOPLE’S 
COURTS’ JUDICIAL STATISTICS:  1949-1998 (CIVIL SECTION)] 52, 264 (Zui gao ren min fa 
yuan yan jiu shi bian [Sup. People’s Ct. Research Office] ed., 2000). 
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system, rules regarding evidence, time limits for the completing cases 
and various stages of the litigation process.42  In 2006, 95% of all first 
instances cases were completed within the time limits.43 
 Nevertheless, the utility of litigation to protect commercial actors is 
affected by many factors, including limitations on the right to sue, the 
use of other means to achieve similar ends, conflicting policy goals, and 
the strength and independence of the courts.  These factors affect certain 
areas of law and types of cases more than others. 
 For instance, shareholder rights were (until recently) mainly 
protected through criminal sanctions and fines.44  The 1993 Company 
Law appeared to limit private shareholders to injunctive relief rather than 
damages. 45   In 2001, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued an 
interpretation preventing shareholders from bringing suits; then four 
months later it issued another interpretation allowing shareholders the 
narrow right to sue for misrepresentation where the CSRC had issued a 
report finding misrepresentation.46  The restrictions were justified on a 
variety of policy grounds:  the judges lacked experience handling such 
cases, jurisdictional rules had yet to be worked out to prevent different 
courts from issuing different awards for suits arising out of the same 
cause of action, and large damage awards against SOEs would result in 
significant losses of state assets.47 
 In 2003, the SPC issued a third, much more detailed, interpretation.48  
Although the interpretation did not expand the subject matter for 
 
42 For example, cases handled through the normal procedure shall be completed 
within six months, while cases handled through summary procedure shall be completed 
within three months.  Civil Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1, 2008), arts. 135, 146, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
43 Xiao Yang zuo zui gao ren min fa yuan gong zuo bao gao [Xiao Yang Delivers 
Supreme People’s Court Work Report], SINA, Mar. 13, 2007, available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-03-13/155812506927.shtml (last visited May 10, 2009) 
[hereinafter SPC Work Report]. 
44 JIANGYU WANG, RULE OF LAW AND RULE OF OFFICIALS: SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
AND ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATION IN CHINA 2-4 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Jiangyu%231%23.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009). 
45 Id. at 3. 
46 Id. at 4. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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litigation, it did clarify a number of procedural and evidentiary issues.49  
After courts gained experience from further study of the issues and the 
handling of several cases, the Company Law50 was amended in 2005 to 
strengthen the rights of minority shareholders to bring suit.51  Courts 
have now begun accepting suits for reasons other than misrepresentation, 
and the SPC appears to be set to issue another interpretation based on the 
experience gained from these cases. 
 Bankruptcy provides another example of interplay between litigation 
and government policy.  The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law passed in 1986 
was limited to SOEs, and was not very effective in practice.52  There 
were on average only 277 bankruptcies a year from 1989 to 1993.53  
Banks objected to provisions that gave priority to workers, while local 
government officials were worried about social unrest from laid-off 
workers, judges lacked independence and the specialized training in 
bankruptcy proceedings, and the support network of trained accountants, 
lawyers and bankruptcy specialists was lacking.54 
 Rather than relying on creditor-initiated bankruptcy proceedings to 
resolve the problem of insolvent SOEs, the government opted for an 
administrative approach, with the State Council encouraging the merger 
of weaker SOEs with stronger ones and carefully allowing selected SOEs 
to go bankrupt based on a regional quota that allowed government 
officials to factor in the likelihood of social unrest in deciding which 
companies could enter bankruptcy proceedings.55  The government also 
reversed the preference for workers by reassigning the priority for the 
proceeds from the sale of secured land use rights to the secured parties, 
in most cases PRC banks.56  Over time, the vast majority of SOEs were 
sold off, with many of the remaining ones—having been exposed to 
increasing competition—becoming less of a burden on the state.57  More 
 
49 Id. 
50 Company Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 
25, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2006), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
51 WANG, supra note 44, at 3. 
52 See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, THE MAKING OF CHINA’S BANKRUPTCY LAW 3 (n.d.), 
available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Halliday.pdf (last visited May 10, 
2009) (noting six elements applicable to bankrupt SOEs). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57  See Joel R. Samuels, Comment, “Tain’t What You Do”:  Effect of China’s 
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generally, the private sector (including collective enterprises) began to 
play an increasingly dominant role in the economy. 
 These changes were reflected in the 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law, which applies to both state-owned and non-stated-owned 
companies, except for small unincorporated private businesses and some 
2000 SOEs that are either at particular financial risk or in sensitive 
industries.58  The courts now oversee bankruptcies, aided by the private 
professions of lawyers, accountants and other bankruptcy specialists.59  
While the government’s role has been diminished, there are still various 
opportunities for the government to intervene to pursue non-economic 
policy goals such as social stability.  These include special approvals for 
certain SOEs and financial companies to commence bankruptcy 
proceedings,60  possible pressure on courts from local governments to 
decide that companies are not technically insolvent or to simply refuse to 
accept the case, and government pressure on banks to issue policy loans 
to prop up ailing SOEs.  Nevertheless, the 2006 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law provides creditors the means to initiate bankruptcy proceedings,61 
and, on the whole, represents a large step forward in clarifying and 
strengthening their rights. 
 Whereas the general trend in securities litigation and bankruptcy 
proceedings has been to provide a more rule-based system that 
strengthens the hand of private actors, antidumping remains an area that 
is much more politicized and dependent on administrative discretion.62  
 
Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law on State Owned Enterprises, 26 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 
169, 178 (2008) (noting SOE privatization since 1978 has caused SOE contribution to 
GDP to decline from roughly eighty percent to between seventeen to fifty percent). 
58 Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 
2006, effective June 1, 2007), arts. 2, 7, 133-34, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 
10, 2009); HALLIDAY, supra note 52, at 5. 
59 Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 
2006, effective June 1, 2007), arts. 3, 24, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
60 Id. art. 134; see also 30 Chinese Securities Firms Enter Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
XINHUA, Nov. 13, 2006, available at http://english.cri.cn/2946/2006/11/13/53@ 
162350.htm (last visited May 10, 2009) (noting CSRC is on a “mission to overhaul the 
[securities] sector”). 
61  Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), art. 7, translated in ISINOLAW 
(last visited May 10, 2009). 
62 WANG, supra note 44, at 7. 
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China is one of the most frequent targets of antidumping claims, and 
appears to pay a rising-power premium.63  On the other hand, China has 
increasingly turned to antidumping actions against others doing business 
in China.64  The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is charged with 
both investigating the existence of dumping and recommending whether 
duties should be imposed.65  Antidumping proceedings remain shrouded 
in mystery.  Parties are not allowed access to confidential information 
subject to protective order, to staff reports in particular cases, or even to 
MOFCOM’s standards for calculating the dumping margin and industry 
damage.  As in other countries, decisions appear to be driven by 
domestic political concerns to protect certain vulnerable industries rather 
than by principles of free trade or legal considerations. 
 
C. Enforcement Improving in Urban Areas 
 
 While enforcement is often portrayed as difficult in China, recent 
studies have found significant improvements in urban areas, where 
“more than half of the creditors/plaintiffs . . . receive 100 per cent of the 
amount owed, and three-quarters are able to receive partial 
enforcement.”66  Moreover, the main reason for non-enforcement is that 
 
63  Noting the parallel to the demonization of Japan in the 1980’s, two authors 
describe “unprecedented” discriminatory policies against China by the United States that 
protect domestic industries and favor China’s competitors.  For example, Chinese 
companies face the most antidumping actions by the United States, are the most likely to 
have duties imposed, and suffer the highest duties—a “China premium” of an additional 
80%—making China “public enemy number one.”  Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, 
U.S. Trade Policy Toward China:  Discrimination and its Implications, in CHALLENGES 
TO THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM:  ADJUSTMENT TO GLOBALIZATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION 58, 58, 61-63 (Peter A. Petri  & Sumner J. La Croix eds., 2007). 
64 China first passed anti-dumping regulations in 1997.  By the end of 2003, the 
country had dealt with 27 such cases against foreign countries and regained an 
accumulated loss of more than 20 billion yuan (US$2.4 billion).  The petrochemical 
sector accounted for 20 of these 27 cases.  Wang Ying, Dumping Hits ;ation’s 
Petrochemical Sector, CHINA DAILY, Mar.  24, 2005, at 11, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/24/content_427593.htm (last visited 
May 10, 2009). 
65 Regulations on Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy (promulgated by the St. Council 
Mar. 25, 1997, effective Mar. 25, 1997), arts. 11-35, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited 
May 10, 2009). 
66  XIN HE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS IN CHINA 2 (n.d.), 
available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Xin%20He%231%23.pdf (last visited 
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defendants are judgment proof; they are insolvent or their assets are 
encumbered.67  No legal system is able to enforce judgments in such 
circumstances. 
 Although cross-country comparisons can be misleading, it would 
appear that enforcement in China may be less problematic than in many 
jurisdictions, including in rich countries such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, or Russia.68  In the World Bank’s Doing Business 2009 
survey, China ranked eighteenth out of 181 economies in contract 
enforcement. 69   The survey measures the time, cost and number of 
procedures involved from the moment a suit is filed until payment is 
made.70 
 The main reasons for the improvement in enforcement are changes in 
the nature of the economy, general judicial reforms aiming at institution 
building and increasing the professionalism of the judiciary, and specific 
measures to strengthen enforcement.71   The economy in many urban 
areas is now more diversified, with the private sector playing a dominant 
role. 72   The fate of a single company is less important to the local 
government, which has a broader interest in protecting its reputation as 
an attractive investment environment.  As a result, the incentive for 
governments to engage in local protectionism has diminished. 73   In 
contrast, enforcement is predictably more difficult in rural areas, where 
the economy is less developed and diversified, and judicial corruption 
and competence are more serious issues.74 
 
 
May 10, 2009).  
67  Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts:  An Empirical Study of the 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of China, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
249, 273-74 (2001). 
68 HE, supra note 66, at 3. 
69 WORLD BANK & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, supra note 21, at 97. 
70 Id. at 49. 
71 HE, supra note 66, at 2-4, 7. 
72 Id. at 4. 
73 See Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China:  Lessons from Shanghai, 19 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 97, 113 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he magnitude of local protectionism 
is inversely proportional to the prosperity of a locality.”). 
74 HE, supra note 66, at 6. 
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D. Limitations and Ongoing Problems in Litigation:  Judicial 
Competence 
 
 Despite the progress, a variety of problems limit the effectiveness of 
litigation in some circumstances.  First, the quality of the judiciary 
remains a concern, particularly in basic level courts in poorer regions.  
Critics often note that only slightly more than half of all PRC judges 
have college degrees, not all of which are in law.  While true, the 
education level of judges in higher level courts in urban areas is often 
quite high.  For instance, over one-third of High Court judges and nearly 
one-third of Intermediate Court judges in Shanghai have masters or 
doctorate degrees in law.  Education levels also vary by division within 
the same courts.  Among the thirteen judges in Shanghai Intermediate 
Court No. 1 Civil Division No. 5, one has a Ph.D., another is completing 
a Ph.D., eight have masters degrees in law, and the others are studying 
for their masters degrees.75 
 Moreover, eighty percent of Chinese courts are basic level courts, 
most of which are in rural areas.  Much of their caseload consists of the 
types of small claims and minor property disputes that in other countries 
would be handled by magistrates and other laypersons without any, or 
any significant, formal legal training.  Further, in many cases, parties in 
rural basic courts are seeking a decision that comports with local norms 
rather than a technically correct decision based on formal state law.  As 
discussed in Part  H, the vast majority of disputes that make their way to 
court are settled through judicial mediation.  Some studies have found 
that young college graduates who formalistically rely on the law to settle 
disputes are perceived as less effective than older judges with less legal 
training who are more familiar with local norms and customs.76 
 In any event, the long term trend is toward better educated judges.  
The Judges Law requires judges to have college degrees.77  In most cases, 
 
75 Yong xing dong shu xie “Shanghai fa yuan jing shen” [Use Action to Show the 
“Spirit of Shanghai Courts”], Aug. 6, 2004, available at http://www.a-
court.gov.cn/platformData/infoplat/pub/no1court_2802/docs/200408/d_22511.html (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
76 See ZHU SULI, SONG FA XIA XIANG:  ZHONGGUO JI CENG SI FA ZHI DU YAN JIU [BRING 
THE LAW TO THE COUNTRYSIDE:  RESEARCH CONCERNING THE BASIC LEVEL OF THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN CHINA] 322-86 (2000). 
77 The Judges Law was amended to provide that new judges must have a bachelor’s 
degree in law or a bachelor’s degree in some other subject combined with knowledge of 
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new judges now have law degrees.78  Judges are now also expected to 
pass the national unified exam, although certain exceptions can be made 
in remote areas where courts may find it difficult to attract judges with 
the necessary qualifications.79  One of the problems has been that once 
judges in rural areas pass the national exam, they often leave the court 
for more lucrative private practice as lawyers.80 
 
E. Judicial Corruption 
 
 A second concern is judicial corruption.  Judicial corruption is hard 
to define and even harder to measure empirically.  The nature and 
incidence of corruption also varies by type of case,81 region and level of 
court. 
 A narrow definition would limit judicial corruption to bribery of 
judges that affects the legal outcome in particular cases.  A broad 
definition of corruption would include any extralegal pressure on judges, 
including social pressure from relatives and friends and internal pressure 
from senior judges in the court, whether or not the pressure affected the 
legal outcome in the case, and regardless of whether the influence was 
for the sole purpose of speeding up the process and obtaining a just 
 
law, plus two years of experience in legal work to become a judge in lower courts, or 
three years of work experience to be appointed to a High People’s Court or the Supreme 
People’s Court.  If one has a masters or Ph.D. in law or in another subject combined with 
equivalent legal knowledge, then only one year of experience is needed to become a 
judge in a lower court or two years of experience to be appointed to a High People’s 
Court or the Supreme People’s Court.  Judges Law (promulgated by the Standing. Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. June 30, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), art. 9(6) para. 1, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
78 Interview with director of international donor agency providing judicial training to 
PRC judges (on file with authors). 
79 Judges Law (promulgated by the Standing. Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. June 30, 
2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), art. 9(6) para. 3, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
80 ZHU SULI, DAO LU TONG XIANG CHENG SHI:  ZHUAN XING ZHONGGUO DE FA ZHI 
[LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA’S TRANSFORMATION] 249 (2004).  A similar pattern has 
emerged in Korea.  See Patricia Goedde, From Dissidents to Institution-Builders:  The 
Transformation of Public Interest Lawyers in South Korea, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 63, 69-74 
(2009) (noting that the judicial examination in South Korea has been extremely difficult, 
in part to keep compensation levels high by limiting the number of lawyers). 
81 Fu, supra note 1, at 212 (noting differences in corrupt practices between criminal 
and administrative cases). 
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outcome. 
 Transparency International, for instance, defines judicial corruption 
as “any inappropriate influence on the impartiality of the judicial process 
by any actor within the court system.”82  This definition includes actions 
by the police, prosecutors, court staff and bailiffs as well as judges.83  It 
includes acts done for financial gain, to enhance future career prospects 
or to comport with social norms.  It includes media influence and popular 
pressure on the courts. 84   And it includes a politicized appointment 
process dominated by a single party or where the appointment of 
individual judges is subject to a political litmus test or based on political 
ideology.85 
 Given such a broad definition, many legal systems would apparently 
be openly endorsing corruption given that the appointment process is 
explicitly political, such as in state elections of judges in the United 
States (where the candidates’ abilities to raise campaign funds 
increasingly plays a determinate role in the outcomes) or in countries 
where a certain number of high court appointments are reserved for each 
party.  Such a definition also makes it difficult to compare judicial 
corruption across countries, as the nature of problems could be very 
different in different countries with similar scores. 
 As a general empirical matter, judicial corruption is highly correlated 
with wealth, as is corruption more generally.86  Accordingly, comparison 
of judicial corruption in a lower-middle-income country such as China to 
judicial corruption in a high-income country such as the United States  
leads to the conclusion that China’s judicial system is more corrupt (and 
that the nature of its corruption is different), while comparison of China’s 
judicial system to that of other lower-middle income countries shows that 
China has been about as successful as others in controlling corruption, as 
 
82  Transparency International, Executive Summary:  Key Judicial Corruption 
Problems, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007:  CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, xxi, 
xxi (Diana Rodriguez & Linda Ehrichs eds., 2007). 
83 Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption Within the Judiciary:  Causes and Remedies, in 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007:  CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 82, at 
3, 7. 
84 Id. at 5. 
85 Id. at 4. 
86 See generally Brian W. Husted, Wealth, Culture, and Corruption, 30 J. INT’L BUS. 
STUD. 339, 350-54 (1999) (studying empirical data and concluding that corruption is 
generally correlated with GNP). 
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it has been in controlling corruption generally.87  This is consistent with 
general corruption data from Transparency International and other 
surveys.88 
 The high correlation of wealth and corruption is also generally true 
within China, where the level of wealth differs significantly across 
regions.  In rural areas where the courts lack adequate funding, there 
tends to be more systematic institutional corruption generated by the 
need to raise funds.  In some cases, judges attempt to persuade or cajole 
potential litigants to file lawsuits or disregard jurisdictional rules to 
obtain litigation fees.  Courts may also aggressively enforce cases filed 
by some institutional plaintiffs, such as local banks, for the sake of 
litigation and enforcement fees, while pursuing other cases less 
aggressively. 
 Although judicial corruption in China appears to be slightly less 
frequent than in other lower-middle income countries, the public 
continues to perceive judicial corruption as a significant problem.  To be 
sure, public perceptions of corruption are generally worse than the reality, 
in part because of sensationalist coverage of particular egregious cases 
that are not representative of the system as a whole, and because of 
distortion or inaccurate reporting in other cases. 89   In all African 
countries except South Africa and all Latin American countries except 
Colombia, the majority of citizens perceive the legal system to be corrupt, 
with more than 80% of the people describing the judicial system as 
corrupt in Bolivia, Cameroon, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.90  At least 
45% of citizens view the judicial system as corrupt in all former soviet 
countries.91  Within Asia, 77% perceive the judicial system as corrupt in 
India, compared to 65% in Taiwan, 52% in Indonesia, 45% in the 
 
87  See Clarke et al., supra note 2, at 22 (“China has less legal corruption than 
countries at similar levels of per capita income.”). 
88  See, e.g., Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, in 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT:  CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 82, at 324, 
325-32 tbl.1 (ranking China seventieth out of 163 countries in the Corruption Perception 
Index); see also DALI L. YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN:  MARKET 
TRANSITION AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 254-57 (2004) (noting that 
while corruption is still perceived to be prevalent, China’s scores in several global 
corruption surveys have improved). 
89 Pepys, supra note 83, at 10. 
90 Id. at 12, 13 tbl.2. 
91 Id. 
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Philippines, 26% in Japan, and 9% in Singapore.92  Even in the United 
States, the majority describes the judicial system as corrupt, while one of 
three Canadians holds similar views.93 
 Given the broad definition of corruption, it is possible, indeed likely, 
that citizens in different countries have very different problems in mind 
when they complain about judicial corruption.  Moreover, asking 
respondents whether the judicial system is corrupt does not tell us how 
severe the respondents think the problem is or whether they are satisfied 
overall with the courts despite concerns about corruption in some cases. 
 
F. Popular Attitudes Toward the Court 
 
 Looking at public perceptions of the judicial system more broadly, 
Chinese citizens have surprisingly positive attitudes toward the courts, 
although the results vary widely by region, type of case, amount of actual 
experience with the courts, and the nature of the plaintiff. 
 One large survey using GPS readings to generate a representative 
sample found a “widespread belief that courts are more effective and fair 
than preexisting alternatives, such as mediation.” 94  In a survey of 
business people in Shanghai and Nanjing between 2002 and 2004, almost 
three out four gave the court system a very high to average rating, 
compared to 25% who rated the system low or very low.95 
 In still another survey, Ethan Michelson found that Beijing 
respondents are more trusting of the courts than their Chicago 
counterparts, and evaluate the performance of the courts more 
positively.96  Respondents in Beijing were twice as likely as Chicago 
residents to agree with the claim that courts are “doing a good job.”97  
Moreover, whereas roughly 40% of Chicago residents disagreed or 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Pierre F. Landry et al., Introduction:  Markets, Courts, and Leninism, 9 CHINA REV. 
1, 12 (forthcoming 2009). 
95 Clarke et al., supra note 2, at 43. 
96  TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d. ed. 2006) (giving Chicago 
statistics); Email from Ethan Michelson, Associate Professor of Sociology and East Asian 
Languages and Cultures, Adjunct Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, to 
author (Apr. 24, 2007) (on file with authors) (basing results on a 2001 survey of 1,300 
Beijing residents that he conducted with sociologists from Renmin University). 
97 TYLER, supra note 96, at 50-53 tbls.4.7, 4.8; Michelson, supra note 96. 
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strongly disagreed that the courts generally guarantee everyone a fair 
trial,98 only 10% of Beijing residents and 28% of rural residents held 
similar negative views. 99   And whereas 43% of Chicago residents 
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that judges are 
basically honest, 100  only 9% of Beijing residents and 29% of rural 
residents held similar views.101 
 To put these numbers in a broader comparative context, barely half 
of Belgians believe court decisions are just, while 60% lack confidence 
in the judiciary. 102   Over 40% of British citizens have little or no 
confidence in judges and the courts.103  In France, only 38% of the public 
has confidence in the judiciary, with only 21% believing judges are 
independent from economic circles and only 17% believing they are 
independent from political powers.104 
 To be sure, there is still room for improvement.  Chinese citizens 
with actual experience with the courts tend to be less satisfied, although 
that is also true elsewhere. 105   There are also significant differences 
between rural and urban residents.106  Urban residents are much more 
likely to litigate, and more likely to be satisfied with their experience, 
than rural residents.107 
 
98 TYLER, supra note 96, at 49 tbl.4.6. 
99 Michelson, supra note 96. 
100 TYLER, supra note 96, at 47. 
101 Michelson, supra note 96. 
102  Mike Hough & Julian V. Roberts, Confidence in Justice:  An International 
Review, 243 FINDINGS 1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/ 
pdfs04/r243.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009). 
103 Id. at 2 tbl.1. 
104 Pierre Grelley, Les Français et la Justice, 2, 5 (1997), available at 
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/984001248/0000.pdf (last visited May 
10, 2009).  A more recent study shows that, in France, 37% believe the administration of 
justice to be independent of political power. Les Français et l'indépendance de la justice, 
Feb. 18, 2004, available at http://www.csa-fr.com/dataset/data2004/opi20040211b.htm 
(last visited May 10, 2009). 
105 See ETHAN MICHELSON, POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS DISPUTE PROCESSING IN 
URBAN AND RURAL CHINA 7 (2008) (giving account of variations in use and perceptions 
of rural and urban Chinese courts).  But see Herbert M. Kritzer & John Voelker, 
Familiarity Breeds Respect:  How Wisconsin Citizens View Their Courts, 82 JUDICATURE 
58 (1998) (reporting that, in contrast to other studies, Wisconsin residents who had been 
to court recently had more favorable opinions about courts). 
106 See MICHELSON, supra note 105, at 3-7 (giving account of variations in use and 
perceptions of rural and urban Chinese courts). 
107 Id. at 4-6. 
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 The background of the parties also matter.  Gallagher and Wang 
found that while parties’ feelings of dissatisfaction are mitigated by gains 
in internal efficacy, “[o]lder urban disputants employed in the state 
sector are more prone to feelings of disillusionment, powerlessness, and 
inefficacy.  Younger, rural disputants employed in the non-state sectors 
are more likely to have positive evaluations of their legal experience and 
to embrace the legal system as a potential space for rights protection.” 108  
This reflects different perceptions of substantive justice.109  Older SOE 
employees feel that they have been cast aside in the process of SOE 
downsizing, in breach of the implicit social contract where they worked 
for low wages in exchange for lifetime security.110  Thus, they are not 
happy with the court’s decision against them in their various disputes 
between the employees and their enterprise even when it is legally 
correct.111 
 In any event, the majority of people who are dissatisfied are still 
likely to sue.112  Interestingly, cadres, Party members and other political 
elites are less likely to have disputes in the first place, more likely to turn 
to the courts if they have disputes, but no more likely to be satisfied with 
the courts than other parties.113 
 
G. Judicial Independence 
 
 Judicial independence is a complicated topic, as there are many 
different ways influence can be exerted on the judiciary, and courts may 
enjoy more independence in some areas, such as commercial cases, than 
in other politically sensitive areas.114  Moreover, the experiences of many 
 
108 Mary Gallagher & Yuhua Wang, Users and ;on-Users:  Legal Experience and its 
Effect on Legal Consciousness, in CHINESE JUSTICE:  CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Margaret Woo et. al. eds., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3-4, 
on file with authors). 
109 Id. (manuscript at 24-25). 
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112  Cf. Mary E. Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law in China: “Informed 
Disenchantment” and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 783, 
(2006) (noting Chinese government campaign to increase use of courts has produced 
more litigation). 
113 MICHELSON, supra note 106, at 4-5. 
114 See generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA:  LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF 
LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., forthcoming 2009). 
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developing countries demonstrate that judicial independence must be 
balanced against the need for judicial accountability:  enhancing the 
authority and independence of incompetent or corrupt judges does not 
lead to more justice.115 
 Apart from bribery or other inappropriate influence by the other 
party, the biggest concern of most commercial litigants has been local 
protectionism.  As noted, while local protectionism is still an issue in less 
developed rural areas, particularly in lower level courts, local 
protectionism in urban areas is now less of a concern.  Party organs and 
government entities in more developed areas have little incentive to 
intervene in most commercial cases. 
 Nevertheless, some investors and commentators continue to worry 
about Party or government interference in particular cases involving key 
SOEs or key industrial sectors; where the amount at stake is high or the 
legal issue is particularly significant to national or local interests; or 
where the outcome of the case might affect particular government 
officials who, for example, may have been involved in corrupt behavior 
or responsible for decisions that would lead to losses for the defendant 
company. 
 Fueling such concerns are government policies that seek to protect 
domestic industries.  In 2006, the State Council announced that seven 
industries were to remain under “absolute” state control:  armaments, 
electricity, oil, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation and shipping.116  
In addition, several others would remain under “relatively strong” state 
control, including manufacturing, automobiles, electronics, architecture, 
steel, metallurgy, chemicals, surveillance, science and technology. 117  
The goal is to produce thirty to fifty globally competitive enterprise 
groups.  The government is also developing a system similar to that in 
the U.S. to investigate the impact of economic transactions on national 
security, and to investigate and retaliate against trade barriers in other 
 
115  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Independence and Corruption, in GLOBAL 
CORRUPTION REPORT:  CORRUPTION IN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 82, at 15, 24.  For 
China, see Dingjian Cai, The Development of Constitutionalism in the Transition of 
Chinese Society, 19 COL. J. ASIAN L. 1, 19-24 (2005) (noting that increasing authority, has 
created a breeding ground of corruption among many Chinese officials). 
116 Zhao Huanxin, China ;ames Key Industries for Absolute State Control, CHINA 
DAILY, Dec. 19, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-
12/19/content_762056.htm (last visited May 10, 2009). 
117 Id. 
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countries.118   The Anti-Monopoly Law provides for national security 
assessments according to relevant laws and regulations in certain 
mergers involving foreign interests, thus subjecting such mergers to both 
competition law and national security clearance.119  Further, the Anti-
Monopoly Law does not adequately address administrative monopolies 
and sectors dominated by large SOEs.120  And, as noted, the bankruptcy 
law contains a carve-out for certain SOEs, while antidumping cases 
appear to be heavily influenced by political factors, with the MOFCOM 
rather than the courts playing the dominant role. 
 
H. Mediation 
 
 While the general trajectory for commercial litigation has been 
relatively consistent and progressive, the nature, incidence and 
government sponsorship of mediation has been more varied.  Mediation 
has always been a major form of dispute resolution in China, with 
ongoing debates about whether its popularity during the imperial era was 
due more to cultural factors, such as the Confucian emphasis on harmony, 
or institutional constraints, such as the limited budgets provided 
magistrates for resolving civil disputes.  During the Mao era, mediation 
continued to be the most popular means for resolving civil disputes.121  
However, in contrast to the traditional era, there was less emphasis on 
social harmony and more emphasis on political ideology and mediation 
as tool for educating, reforming and advancing society.122 
 Today, there are various types of mediation:  mediation by People’s 
Mediation Committees,123 specialized mediation such as labor mediation, 
informal and formal commercial mediation (the latter by professional 
 
118 Foreign Trade Law (Amended in 2004) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 6, 2004, effective July 1, 2004), arts. 37-39, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
119 Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 31, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 
10, 2009). 
120 See id., art.7 (directing sector-dominating SOEs to act in good faith). 
121 Philip C. C. Huang, Divorce Law Practices and the Origins, Myths, and Realities 
of Judicial “Mediation” in China, 31 MODERN CHINA 151, 154 (2005). 
122 See id. at 171-72 (discussing emphases in mediation in divorce context). 
123  See generally Aaron Halegua, Reforming the People’s Mediation System in 
Urban China, 35 H.K. L. J. 715 (2005) (describing the history and structure of People’s 
Mediation Committees). 
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third-party mediation organizations,) judicial mediation, and mediation 
during arbitration.  The popularity of all types of mediation had been 
decreasing until recently, except for formal third-party commercial 
mediation, which has never been popular.124  For instance, the percentage 
of civil and economic cases resolved through judicial mediation 
decreased from 69% and 76% in 1989 to 36.7% and 30.4% in 2001.125 
 There were many reasons for the decline.126  Most fundamentally, 
mediation came to be seen as inconsistent with rule of law.  People’s 
mediators often lacked legal training.  Even in judicial mediation, many 
cases were decided based on factors other than law, with judges 
sometimes pressuring parties to accept settlements, thus depriving them 
of their legal rights. 
 In addition, as noted, the increased professionalization of judges and 
lawyers, and the streamlining of the litigation process, made litigation 
more attractive.  With heavier caseloads and stricter time deadlines for 
completing cases, judges discovered that mediating cases took more of 
their time on an hourly basis than simply trying the case. 
 There were also more one-off, high-value contractual disputes 
between arms-length parties who simply wanted to have their legal rights 
enforced.  The total value of contract disputes rose 40.9% on average 
from 1983 to 1998, while the average value of the disputes increased 
11.9% per year on average.127 
 Moreover, several studies found that mediated settlements were not 
necessarily any easier to enforce than final judgments, with non-
compliance rates ranging from 50 to 80 percent.128  Parties were in effect 
 
124 See generally Randall Peerenboom & Kathleen Scanlon, An Untapped Dispute 
Resolution Option:  Mediation Offers Companies Distinct Advantages in Certain Cases, 
CHINA BUS. REV., July/Aug. 2005, at 36, 38-40 (2005) (discussing mediation options in 
China). 
125 Fan Yu, Positive Research on Judicial Mediation (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors). 
126 See id. (elaborating on reasons for decline in mediation).  See also Fu Hualing & 
Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice:  The Limits of Civil Justice 
Reform in China 3 (Oct. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1306800 (last visited May 10, 2009) (explaining how a decline 
in court-mediation arose as a consequence of the rise of judicial autonomy, the rule of law, 
and judicial professional). 
127 Clarke et al., supra note 2, at 40. 
128 Id. at 42. 
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using the mediation process as a delay tactic.129 
 Despite the overall decline, mediation has varied by region and level 
of court. 130   Mediation in urban courts dropped dramatically:  the 
mediation rate in Guangdong courts fell from 67.7% in 1989 to 23.6% in 
2001, while Shenzhen courts mediated less than 12% of cases in 2001.131  
In contrast, although mediation rates also decreased somewhat in most 
basic level rural courts, many such courts continued to mediate 50 to 
70% of cases. 
 Mediation rates in intermediate courts are much lower than in basic 
level courts.  For instance, while mediation rates in Fujian basic level 
courts ranged from 30 to 50 percent, rates in intermediate courts ranged 
from 10 to 20 percent.132  This is not surprising given the higher level of 
professionalism, the higher stakes, and the fact that upper level courts are 
often serving as second instance courts hearing cases on appeal that 
obviously were not settled through mediation. 
 In 2002, the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice began to re-
emphasize mediation.133  The SPC and the Ministry worried that more 
cases were being appealed, adding to the costs of the judicial system.  
Judges for their part did not want to be reversed on appeal, as a high 
number of reversals would diminish their chance for promotion or in 
some cases affect their salary and bonus.  More fundamentally, the 
 
129 Id. at 33-34. 
130  Measures to hold judges responsible for wrongfully decided cases and 
performance evaluation criteria created some incentive for judges to mediate cases.  
Some courts used the number of appeals or party complaints to measure performance.  As 
a result, some judges sought to mediate disputes or persuade the plaintiffs to withdraw 
their suit, particularly when the law was not clear, rather than risking reversal on appeal 
or complaints from parties unsatisfied with the result.  Fu & Cullen, supra note 126, at 49. 
131 Id. at 53. 
132 Fan, supra note 125. 
133 Id.  See also Several Rules for the Works of People’s Mediation (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Justice Sept. 26, 2002, effective Nov. 1, 2002), arts. 20-24, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009) (regulating procedures by which disputes may be 
accepted for mediation); Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the 
Application of Summary Procedures in the Trial of Civil Cases (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct. Sept. 10, 2003, effective Dec. 1, 2003), art. 14, translated in LAWINFOCHINA 
(last visited May 10, 2009) (listing types of cases that must be mediated before court may 
hear them); Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues Concerning Civil 
Mediation of the People's Courts (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Sept. 16, 2004, 
effective Nov. 1, 2004), art. 2, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009) 
(mandating mediation where available). 
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policy change can be traced to shortcomings in the litigation system 
mentioned earlier.  Many parties were not satisfied with the results of 
litigation because of a perceived lack of judicial competence, actual or 
suspected corruption, the feeling that laws are at odds with local norms, 
difficulties in enforcing judgments, or simply the plaintiff’s lack of 
understanding or unrealistically high expectations of what a legal system 
can do. 
 Another major reason behind the shift toward mediation was the 
inability of courts to provide an adequate legal remedy in the kind of 
“growing pains” cases that arise in developing countries, such as land-
taking cases, labor and environmental disputes, and cases involving 
socio-economic rights or entitlements including pensions, medical and 
welfare claims.  The courts’ inability to provide an adequate remedy in 
such cases led to a huge increase in petitions to the courts and other 
government entities by disgruntled parties seeking relief, and a sharp 
spike in protests and social disturbances. 134   The mediation of such 
disputes was thus part of the broader strategy to create a harmonious 
society.135 
 The change in policy toward mediation appears to have had only a 
minor impact.  The percentage of civil (including economic) cases settled 
through mediation rose only slight from 31% in 2004 to 32.1% in 
2005.136  As before, the rate tends to be much higher in rural areas, and in 
lower courts.137 
 This emphasis however has led to some unintended consequences.  
Judges in some courts may be caught between solving cases in an 
efficient manner and the political requirement of a higher mediation rate.  
To maintain efficiency, some judges have transformed mediation in ways 
that consume less time and energy and yet satisfy the new push to 
increase mediation.  They will, for example, hear the case to the end and 
then ask the parties if they are willing to settle the dispute.  To achieve a 
higher mediation rate, some judges persuade, plead, and even force the 
litigation parties to accept a mediation result.  Consequently, many 
 
134 See Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang:  An Alternative to the Formal Legal Institutions, 
42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103, 158-65 (2006) (discussing staggering increase in informal 
petitioning). 
135 Fu & Cullen, supra note 126, at 4.  
136 Fan, supra note 125. 
137 Id. 
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litigants change their mind after they reluctantly sign the mediation letter, 
which may be leading to higher rates of compulsory enforcement.  And 
in some default on bank loans cases, the banks and the borrower will sign 
a mediation agreement even though it is clear to all that borrowers have 
no ability to repay.  However, the banks can use the settlement 
agreement to seek compulsory enforcement.  Once that fails, they can 
then write off the loans as bad debt.138 
 
I. Arbitration 
 
 The PRC arbitration system consists primarily of the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), 
the China Maritime Arbitration Commission, and almost 200 local 
arbitration commissions set up in large- and medium-sized cities 
throughout China.  CIETAC has been by far the most important in terms 
of foreign investors.139 
 CIETAC is one of the busiest arbitration centers in the world.  While 
overall arbitration is insignificant relative to the number of disputes 
resolved through mediation or litigation, CIETAC’s caseload has risen 
dramatically in just 20 years from a mere 37 cases in 1985 to 1,118 cases 
in 2007, of which 429 involved at least one foreign party.140  By way of 
comparison, in 2007 there were 621 International Centre for Dispute 
Resolution (ICDR) arbitrations and 599 International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) arbitrations.141 
 
138 Tang Ying-Mao & Sheng Liu-Gang, Min shang shi zhi xing cheng xu zhong de 
“shuang gao’ xian xiang” [The ‘Double High’ Phenomenon in Civil and Commercial 
Execution Process], 1 FALU YU SHEHUI KEXUE [L. & SOC. SCI.] 1 (2006). 
139 Will W. Shen & Iris H. Y. Chiu, Arbitration in China:  History and Structure, in 1 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE 3, 14-23 (Jerome A. Cohen et al. eds., 2004). 
140  YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
278 (1996) (1985 statistic); Ashby Jones & Andrew Batson, Concerns About China 
Arbitration Rise, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB121029284891279427.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (2007 statistics). 
141 AAA’s 2008 Caseload up 8 Percent, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=35937 (Apr. 20 
2009) (last visited May 10, 2009) (ICDR statistics);  Jesse Greenspan, Cost, Convenience 
Drive Rise in Asia Arbitrations, LAW360, May 6, 2008 (ICC statistics).  The ICDR is the 
international division of the American Arbitration Association.  In 2008, the number of 
arbitrations in both of these forums increased further. AAA’s 2008 Caseload, supra; 
Greenspan, supra. 
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 CIETAC has continually responded to criticisms and market 
demands by amending its rules—six times since 1988—most recently in 
2005.142  The revisions reflect two general trends:  first, convergence 
with international best practices; second, more autonomy and flexibility 
for the parties.143 
 CIETAC arbitrations are generally considered to be substantively 
fair.144  A survey by the American Chamber of Commerce found that 
75% of respondents who had actual experience with CIETAC arbitration 
believed CIETAC measured up favorably to arbitration at other major 
international centers, whereas only 45% of those who lacked experience 
thought so.145   There does not seem to be a systematic bias against 
foreign parties.  In 2000, foreign party claimants prevailed in 101 out of 
185 cases against Chinese respondents, and lost in 28 cases.146  From 
2004 to 2006, U.S. parties prevailed in twenty-seven cases and lost in 
twenty-five cases, with the others ended up settled or still pending, even 
though the U.S. party was the respondent in 46 of the 81 cases.147 
 Despite the recent rule changes, investors still find fault with 
CIETAC on several fronts.  The Ministry of Justice has imposed 
limitations on the role of foreign lawyers, who are not allowed to 
interpret PRC law but must rather rely on PRC co-counsel.148  In addition, 
the pay for arbitrators is low by international standards,149 thus limiting 
the number of foreigners willing to serve in the crucial post of chief 
arbitrator.  And ad hoc arbitration is not allowed.150 
 There has also been criticism of CIETAC scrutiny of awards, 
 
142 LIJUN CAO, CHINESE LAW AND BUSINESS:  CIETAC AS A FORUM FOR RESOLVING 
BUSINESS DISPUTES 3 (n.d.), available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/ 
Cao%231%23.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009). 
143 Id. 
144 While CIETAC has enjoyed a solid reputation thus far, some commentators have 
recently expressed concerns that CIETAC arbitration is becoming subject to political 
pressure and corruption  See generally Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, 
FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Jan/Feb. 2005, at 31 (expressing increased pessimism 
regarding CIETAC’s ability and desire to conduct fair hearings). 
145 Johnson Tan, A Look at CIETAC:  Is it Fair and Efficient?, CHINA L. & PRACTICE, 
April 2003, at 24, 26. 
146 Id. 
147 CAO, supra note 142, at 2. 
148 Id. at 5-6. 
149 Id. at 4. 
150 Id. at 6. 
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although other arbitral bodies, including the ICC and Hong Kong 
Arbitration Commission, also scrutinize awards. 151   Moreover, ICC 
scrutiny appears to be much more frequent and invasive than CIETAC 
scrutiny.  In 2005, the ICC laid down modifications as to form and/or 
drew attention to points of substance when scrutinizing 256 of 325 
awards, and requested the arbitral tribunal resubmit its award for 
approval in 31 cases.152  CIETAC has not published information about 
the number of awards scrutinized or the results.  However, there 
apparently has been no confirmed case reported of CIETAC scrutiny 
resulting in substantive changes to awards. 
 
III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISPUTES 
 
 Socio-economic cases involving pension and other welfare claims, 
labor disputes, land takings and environmental issues present problems 
for developing countries because institutions are weak and the state lacks 
the financial resources to address what are in essence economic 
concerns. 153   Characteristics of dispute resolution of socio-economic 
cases include:  (i) notably less effective resolutions than in commercial 
cases; (ii) a trend toward de-judicialization, in contrast to the 
judicialization of commercial disputes; (iii) a sharp rise in mass-plaintiff 
suits; (iv) a dramatic rise in letters, petitions, and social protests in 
response to the inability of the courts and other mechanisms to 
adequately address citizen demands and expectations; (v) a reallocation 
of resources toward the least well-off members of society as part of 
government efforts to contain social instability and create a harmonious 
society, with a simultaneous increase in targeted repression of sources of 
potential instability, including political dissidents, NGOs and activist 
lawyers. 
 
A. Pension and Other Welfare Claims 
 
 
151 Id. at 7. 
152 2005 Statistical Report, 17 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 1 (2006). 
153 For an excellent study of various efforts to address environmental issues, ongoing 
problems and policy recommendations, see generally BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ, REGULATING 
LAND AND POLLUTION IN CHINA:  LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT; THEORY 
AND CASES (2006). 
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 In the past, the employer paid for worker pensions.  But this practice 
could not be sustained in the face of more severe market competition.  
Many reforms have sought to revamp the pension system, the most 
significant of which is the establishment of social security funds to which 
both the employers and the employees have to contribute a part. 154  
Nevertheless, SOE reform and the transition to a market economy have 
led to many disputes over pension payments and other welfare benefits, 
including unemployment insurance, job relocation and training expenses, 
worker’s compensation benefits and medical care.155 
 Many SOEs have gone bankrupt and ceased to exist or are insolvent.  
Others have been sold off or restructured.  The new buyer or restructured 
company is unwilling or unable to assume the welfare obligations.  Some 
enterprises are unwilling or unable to contribute their share to the social 
security funds for employees, or to provide retraining, unemployment or 
social security payments for laid-off employees.  In some cases, local 
government officials unilaterally decrease the amount of benefits.  
Meanwhile, some social security fund managers have refused to 
distribute the pensions or misappropriated funds.156 
 Yet, the courts handle few of these disputes. Both government and 
party officials and the courts have preferred to solve these problems 
through political or administrative channels.  These disputes usually 
involve a large number of pensioners who share a common history and 
grievance, increasing the likelihood that they will lead to mass 
protests.157  Thus, local party and government officials have a strong 
incentive to resolve these problems directly given the importance of 
maintaining social stability in their performance evaluations.  If 
necessary, governments will often pay off the workers.  Some 
governments particularly in more affluent areas have continually 
 
154 See William Hurst & Kevin J. O’Brien, China’s Contentious Pensioners, 2002 
CHINA Q. 345, 348 (“Various reforms have been proposed in the last few years, with the 
most widely talked about involving provincially-managed funds, derived from firm and 
employee contributions, which are invested in a range of financial instruments and are 
supposed to become the primary source of funding for an employee’s pension.”). 
155 See generally Robert Guthrie & Miriam Zulfa, Occupational Accident Insurance 
for All Workers:  The ;ew Challenges for China, 3 E. ASIA L. REV. 1 (2008) (elaborating 
worker’s compensation law and labor dispute resolution in China). 
156 As widely reported, one billion yuan of the social security funds in Guangzhou 
has been misappropriated. See, e.g., SPC Work Report, supra note 43. 
157 See Hurst & O’Brien, supra note 154, at 345-46 (describing how similarities 
between pension protestors lead to common complaints). 
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increased the pension standard to keep pace with inflation, thus 
preventing disputes from arising in the first place. 
 Another reason for the limited role of the courts in these cases is that 
the regulatory framework in this area is incomplete and sometimes 
inconsistent.  For example, there has been an ongoing debate as to 
whether these pension claims should be considered a labor dispute or an 
administrative dispute. 158   A 2006 SPC interpretation provides that 
pension and social security disputes between the employer and the 
employee are considered labor litigation, while disputes between the 
employee and the agent charged with managing the funds will not be 
considered labor disputes. 159   However, the interpretation does not 
expressly state that such disputes will be accepted as administrative suits. 
 Even when courts do accept these disputes, they have to work with 
various governmental institutions to find a solution acceptable to all of 
the relevant parties.  Many SOEs were owned by government entities 
higher up in the administrative hierarchy than the courts handling the 
dispute, making it difficult for the court to hold against them.  
Accordingly, courts often emphasize mediation in solving these disputes.
 Sometimes there is little that the courts can do.  For example, a 
Guangzhou intermediate court accepted an administrative litigation 
initiated by 4583 miners, who claimed that the Social Security 
Administrative Bureau had unlawfully modified the pension standard. 160  
The court, after consulting numerous provincial and central authorities, 
rejected the claim on procedural grounds.161  Judges involved in the case 
acknowledged that the dispute was unresolvable through legal 
channels.162 
 
158 Shao Guorong, Shilun shehui baoxianfei jiufen anjian de shouli he chuli [On the 
Handling and of Social Security Litigation], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT 
NET], May 10, 2007, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200705/10 
/245704.shtml (last visited May 10, 2009). 
159  Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning Application of Laws in Hearing 
Labour Dispute Cases (II) (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 14, 2006, effective 
Oct. 1, 2006), arts. 4, 6-7, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
160 Long Sicai deng yu Guangdong Sheng She Hui Bao Xian Ji Jin Guan Li Ju fa 
fang she hui yang lao bao xian xing zheng jiu fen shang su an [Long Sicai et al. v. 
Guangdong Province Social Security Fund Administrative Bureau], No. 42-4624 
(Guangdong High People’s Ct. July 30, 2002), at CHINALAWINFO (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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 Many of these disputes then end up being pursued through the 
petition system or other channels that seek to get high ranking officials 
involved.  For instance, the pensions of more than 10,000 female workers 
from the Shengli Oil Field were terminated in 1997.  The case took 
almost ten years to be partially resolved, and was only resolved after the 
women’s representatives successfully passed the grievance to high 
ranking central government officials.163  The happy ending is due to the 
large number of the affected workers.  In contrast, politically less salient 
pensioners and welfare claimants are less likely to find relief by 
petitioning government officials. 
 
B. Land Takings 
 
 Economic development and urbanization inevitably involve the 
reallocation of land, usually from lower to higher productive users.  In 
the process, some parties are made better off, often developers and 
corrupt government officials, though also the broader public, while other 
individuals lose out.  Land takings have been common, and controversial, 
in China.  They are one of the most common sources of large-scale 
protests.164 
 Land taking cases are complicated in part because of disagreements 
over how the windfall from rising real estate prices is to be allocated.165  
Urban residents, especially those that worked for the government or 
SOEs, are often living in housing originally allocated to them by the state 
for free, and then sold to them at heavily subsidized rates.  When the land 
is requisitioned, the court must decide how much the homeowners should 
be compensated.  Should the current residents be entitled to fair market 
value for their housing and the land use rights, even though the land use 
rights may be unclear and they obtained the housing at subsidized prices? 
Those affected may argue that they worked hard for the state for years 
for low wages, and deserve the windfall.  But they have already benefited 
relative to others who did not have the opportunity to purchase their 
 
163 Qi Guimin & Ji Yuying, Shengli Youtian 10191 ;ugong Yanglaojing Zhengyi 
Yi’an Youla Jieguo [The Pension Disputes Involving 10,191 Female Workers of the 
Shengli Oil Field Were Solved], ZHONGGUO MIN YING KE JI YU JING JI [CHINA NON-
GOVERNMENTAL SCI., TECH. & ECON.] May 2006, at 32, 32-33 (2006).  
164 Susan Whiting, Public Finance and Land Disputes in Rural China, in CHINESE 
JUSTICE, supra note 108. 
165 Id. 
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housing at below-the-market prices.  Similar issues arise in the 
countryside, although farmers may have a greater normative claim to the 
sales from land use rights given the discriminatory policies that 
transferred wealth from rural to urban areas through artificially low 
prices for agricultural products and the large wealth differential between 
rural and urban areas today. 
 A more serious problem in rural areas is that the local governments 
depend heavily on the proceeds from the sale of land to fund 
development and cover government expenses, both directly and 
indirectly by transferring the land to higher productive users, often 
industrial and commercial users, which then pay taxes. 166   The new 
businesses are also a source of jobs.  The generation of wealth and jobs, 
at least in theory, should contribute to social stability, one of the key 
criteria for promotion for local government officials.167 
 Yet what upsets rural and urban citizens the most is the lack of 
transparency and corruption in land takings.  Local governments often 
ignore the requirement to auction land.168  Instead, they requisition the 
land on behalf of a particular party, and then transfer the land at a pre-
arranged price, only a portion of which goes to the original land users.169  
Moreover, many government officials benefit personally from the 
transfer.170 
 Generally, the courts have been ineffective in handling land-taking 
disputes.  Most cases involve a transfer to a more productive user, and 
thus legal challenges on the ground that the taking is not in the public 
interest fail in China as they do elsewhere.171  Given the dependence of 
courts on the local government for funding, judges are not in a position 
to pursue aggressively allegations of corruption on the part of local 
officials.  Moreover, applying central legal standards to land disputes 
often fails to address local needs.  Rather than enhancing social stability, 
some court decisions exacerbate social conflicts.172   In light of these 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480, 483 (2005) (finding 
eminent domain powers are not limited to transfers of land for “use by the public” so long 
as condemnation effectuates a “public purpose,” which includes economic development). 
172 See Whiting, supra note 164. 
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challenges, some local courts have refused to accept land-taking cases, 
with judges advising parties to file suit in a higher court or take up the 
issue directly with government officials.173 
 The government’s response has been to enact a series of measures to 
prevent land taking disputes from arising in the first place, including 
shifting the approval authority upward to provincial governments; re-
emphasizing the need for local officials to hold hearings on taking 
decisions and compensation amounts; requiring that land sales be 
through a public bidding process174; attempting to cool the red hot real 
estate sector; and amending the Land Administration Law175 and passing 
the Property Law176 to clarify and better protect people’s rights.177 
 In addition, the government has sought to relieve the pressure on 
courts by limiting the ability of citizens to challenge taking and 
compensations decisions.  In 2001, the State Council issued the Urban 
Housing Demolition Administrative Regulation, which requires 
developers negotiate a demolition agreement with residents and provides 
details for calculating compensation. 178   However, the Demolition 
Regulation also provides that the developer can apply for a “forced 
demolition” if the residents do not accept a developer’s compensation 
proposal that has been approved by municipal authorities. 179   The 
Demolition Regulation both allows the residents to challenge a 
municipally-approved compensation proposal in court and stipulates that 
the courts cannot stop or suspend a forced demolition that has been 
approved by the municipality.180 
 
173 Id. 
174  E.g., Rural Land Contract Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Aug. 29, 2001, effective Mar. 1, 2003), art. 3, translated in ISINOLAW (last 
visited May 10, 2009) 
175 Land Administration Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong. June 25, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1986), as amended (Aug. 28, 2004), translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
176 Property Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 16, 2007, effective 
Oct. 1, 2007), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
177 See CECC 2004, supra note 1, at 91-95 (2004) (discussing problems faced by 
current landowners and calling for more reform). 
178  Administrative Regulations on Urban House Demolition and Relocation 
(promulgated by St. Council June 13, 2001, effective Nov. 1, 2001), art. 4, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
179 Id. art. 16. 
180 Id. 
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 These measures to reduce land-taking disputes may have some 
impact, but more fundamental changes are likely to be needed.  In 
particular, it may be necessary to address the incentive for rural 
governments to rely on land sales to provide the funds for development.  
One way to do this would be to increase central funding to local 
governments.  As this is unlikely, however, another more feasible 
approach would be to require that all funds from the sale of land use 
rights be transferred to the central government and then redistributed.  
This would also allow the government to reallocate funds from wealthier 
to poorer areas. 
 
C. Labor 
 
 The transition to a market economy, the jarring process of SOE 
reform, and the pressures of economic globalization have resulted in a 
rapid rise in labor disputes.  Labor disputes grew from under 20,000 in 
1994 to over 300,000 in 1996. 181   Once again, there are significant 
regional variations:  the more economically advanced areas such as 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shandong have 
more disputes, as do the areas with significant heavy industry and a large 
number of SOEs, such as Liaoning, Hubei, Fujian and Chongqing.182  
Labor disputes cover areas such as “wages, termination, insurance and 
work injury.”183 
 The resolution of labor disputes involves voluntary mediation, 
mandatory labor arbitration, and litigation if the parties are unsatisfied 
with the results of arbitration.184  While still common, mediation has 
declined in importance.185   Workers do not trust mediators, who are 
usually dominated by the union, which is closely allied with the 
employer.186 
 Workers win the vast majority of arbitration cases:  they prevail in 
“nearly four cases for every one by the employer, and partially win a 
 
181  RON BROWN, CHINA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Brown%231%23.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 3. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. at 4-5 (stating that union mediators are overly responsive to enterprise’s 
interests). 
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majority of the other cases.”187  Nevertheless, a significant percentage of 
arbitration appeals come from employees, either because they were not 
satisfied with the results or the awards were not enforceable.188 
 Litigation of labor disputes plays a role somewhere between the role 
of litigation in commercial disputes and in other socio-economic disputes.  
On the one hand, litigation has become increasingly prevalent and 
effective, as in commercial law.  Labor disputes appealed from 
arbitration to the courts increased to 122,405 in 2005 from under 30,000 
in 1995.189  Whereas in the past, plaintiffs in labor suits often lost, today 
courts frequently uphold the decisions of labor arbitration committees, 
and plaintiffs enjoy a greater than fifty percent success rate in the 
courts.190 
 On the other hand, the courts are often unable to provide effective 
relief for many of the same reasons that apply to other socio-economic 
disputes.  Cases involving back pay and insurance claims are particularly 
difficult to enforce in large part because many companies are operating 
on very thin margins or even insolvent.  Not surprisingly, many disputes 
are resolved through mediation at various stages of the process.  In 
addition to the disputes resolved through enterprise mediation, about 
one-third of the disputes brought to arbitration are resolved through 
mediation, while about one-quarter of the cases brought in litigation are 
mediated settlements.191 
 The inability of the courts to provide effective relief may also 
explain the reluctance to do away with the requirement that workers first 
go through arbitration before going to court.  Although labor advocates 
have long called for the abolition of mandatory arbitration, a 2006 SPC 
interpretation provides only limited relief, allowing workers to go 
directly to court in wage arrears cases where they have written proof of 
unpaid wages from the employer and no other claims are raised.192  In 
 
187 Id. at 3. 
188 Id. at 5-7. 
189 Id. at 4. 
190 Id.  See generally Ethan Michelson, The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to 
Justice:  Chinese Lawyers at Work, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 16-17, 28 (2006) (noting that 
although Chinese lawyers are loathe to take labor cases because of high risks in dealing 
with the clients and low payouts, these cases still make up about ten percent of casework). 
191 BROWN, supra note 181, at 3-4.  If the cases rejected by courts or withdrawn are 
excluded, about one-third of litigated cases are resolved through mediation. Id. at 4. 
192  Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning Application of Laws in Hearing 
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contrast, the 2007 Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law went 
the other way, providing for binding arbitration in certain cases, 
including failure to pay wages or worker’s compensation.193  The law 
also emphasizes mediation and appears to create an additional 
administrative channel for workers to bring suit.194 
 
D. The Petition System 
 
 Another response to the failure of courts to provide adequate 
resolution of disputes was to encourage citizens to make use of the letters 
and visits system (xinfang, hereafter the petition system).  The petition 
system serves a variety of purposes.195   In a very small percentage of 
cases, petitioners are able to obtain relief.196  Perhaps more importantly, 
the system allows citizens to blow off steam, and government officials, 
particularly at the central level, to obtain feedback about tensions in 
society and problems with lower level government officials.197 
 The number of petitions rose dramatically until 1999, and then 
started to decline (similar to the rise in litigation).198  In 2005, the various 
 
Labour Dispute Cases (II) (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 14, 2006, effective 
Oct. 1, 2006), arts. 4, 6-7, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009).  Granted, 
one should not expect the SPC to forge new rights given the tenuous legal basis it has for 
issuing interpretations.  Even the limited change in the SPC’s interpretation would appear 
to be at odds with the Labor Law and thus technically invalid. 
193 Law on Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Dec 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), art. 47, translated in 
ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
194  See id. arts. 10-16, 42 (providing for mediation, even for cases subject to 
arbitration).  Whether the law will provide relief for the courts remains to be seen.  The 
ranges of cases subject to “final” arbitration are limited.  Rather oddly, the law still 
allows workers and even employers to challenge the limited range of cases subject to 
“final” arbitration in the courts.  Id. art. 48. 
195 See Minzner, supra note 134, at 117-120 (elaborating on the various purposes of 
xinfang). 
196 See China Labour Bulletin, A ;ew Force for Social Justice in China, Oct. 11, 
2007, http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/50409 (last visited May 10, 2009) (“a 
recent survey showed that only three in ten thousand petitions result in some form of 
resolution”); CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMM’N ON CHINA, 109TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT 96 
(2005) (“government bureaus address only 0.2 percent of petitions filed”) [hereinafter 
CECC 2005]. 
197 Minzner, supra note 134, at 117-119. 
198 Id. at 161 tbl.1. 
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letters and visits offices received 12.7 million complaints,199 with the 
number of petitions declining in 2006 by 15.5% to just over ten 
million.200  Petitioners may seek relief from a wide variety of sources, 
including Party organs, government agencies, the procuracy and the 
courts.201  Provincial courts at all levels handled a total of approximately 
3.9 million letters and visits in 2006, or slightly fewer petitions than the 
5.2 million first instance civil cases.202  The 2006 figures were a decrease 
of 4.71% from 2005, and more than 50% from 1999, when the total 
number of complaints handled by the courts peaked at 10.7 million.203  In 
contrast, in 1999 China’s courts handled 5.7 million first instance 
cases.204 
 According to one survey, 63.4% of those who eventually brought 
their complaints to the central authorities in Beijing had first sought 
resolution in the courts.205  The courts declined to accept 43% of the 
cases,206 courts decided against the petitioners in 55% of the cases, and 
were unable to enforce judgments in favor the petitioners in 2% of the 
cases.207  Most complaints arise from the way cases were handled in rural 
courts. 
 In many cases, however, the parties do not understand the law or are 
unsatisfied with legally correct decisions.208   In other cases, there is 
nothing the courts can do.  These cases include enforcement cases where 
the company is insolvent and judgment proof; corruption cases involving 
local government officials; bankruptcy cases and land taking cases; and 
 
199 Posting of Carl Minzner to Chinese Law and Politics Blog, What Has Happened 
to Petitioning in China Since the 2005 Xinfang Regulations?, http://sinolaw.typepad.com/ 
chinese_law_and_politics_/2007/04/what_has_happen.html (Apr. 18, 2007 17:09 CDT) 
(last visited May 10, 2009). 
200 Id.  Note that in 2005, the xinfang system was substantially reformed.  Id. 
201 Minzner, supra note 134, at 116. 
202 HONGBO LI, FAZHI XIANDAIHUA JINCHENG ZHONG DE RENMIN XINFANG [PEOPLE’S 
PETITION IN THE PROCESS OF LEGAL MODERNIZATION] (2007). 
203 Id. 
204 Fu & Cullen, supra note 126, at 6 chart 1.  The cited figure includes all civil, 
economic, administrative, and criminal cases. 
205 Minzner, supra note 134, at 119. 
206 Id. 
207 Taisu Zhang, The Xinfang Phenomenon: Why the Chinese Prefer Administrative 
Petitioning over Litigation 13 (Yale L. Sch. Student Scholarship Series., No. 68., 2008), 
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/student/papers/68 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
208 CECC 2005, supra note 196, at 177 n.12. 
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socio-economic issues such as claims for retirement benefits when the 
company is insolvent or the government lacks the funds to provide 
adequate medical care. 209   Unable to obtain effective relief, many 
petitioners persist in their efforts, repeatedly petitioning the same entities 
for relief, broadening their appeals to a wider range of entities, and 
escalating the disputes by taking their cases to Beijing, where they 
besiege government offices in the hope that central authorities will look 
more kindly on their claims than local officials. 
 In the face of this upsurge in petitions and the increasing escalation 
of disputes to central authorities, the State Council amended the 
Regulations on Letters and Visits in 2005. 210   The amendments 
strengthened the rights of citizens in some respects.  For instance, the 
Regulations call for greater procedural fairness, increased powers for the 
letters and visits offices to respond to citizen complaints, and enhanced 
supervision of government officials involved in the process, including 
through the imposition of legal liability for those who do not carry out 
their duties.211 
 However, the authorities appear to be increasingly worried that too 
many people are blocking government offices, interfering with officials 
trying to do their work and upsetting social stability.  The Regulations 
limit the petitioners to three appeals to successively higher-level 
administrative agencies,212 limit the number of representatives for each 
mass complaint to five,213 and emphasize the need to obey the law and 
not disturb social order.214 
 The Public Security Administration Punishments Law of 2005 
suggested that the government will start to crack down on those who 
repeatedly petition government offices.215  In recent years, there were 
 
209 Benjamin Liebman, A Populist Threat to China’s Courts?, in CHINESE JUSTICE, 
supra note 108. 
210 Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits (promulgated by the St. Council Jan. 
10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005), , translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
211 Id. arts. 40-46 (imposing legal liability on administrative organs and personnel 
for nonfeasance and misfeasance related to xinfang). 
212 Id. arts. 34-35. 
213 Id. art. 18. 
214 Id. art. 20. 
215 See Law on Public Security Administration Punishments (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Aug. 28, 200, effective Mar. 1, 2006), arts. 1-2, 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited May 10, 2009) (criminalizing disruptions of 
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numerous media reports of people detained for petitioning activities.  In a 
2007 survey of 560 petitioners who had come to Beijing, 70% felt that 
local government retaliation had become more severe.216  Nearly, two-
thirds of petitioners faced detention, with 18.8% sentenced to prison or 
“re-educated” through labor (a form of administrative detention).217 
 
E. Mass-Plaintiff Suits 
 
 Many socio-economic cases involve multiple plaintiffs.  There were 
538,941 multi-party suits in 2004, up 9.5% from 2003.218  Land takings, 
labor disputes and welfare claims are three of the major types of multi-
party suits.  In 2004 alone, Shanghai Intermediate Court No. 1 handled 
21 multi-plaintiff cases, of which 17 involved land takings, relocations 
and real estate disputes.219  In 2006, there were 14,000 collective labor 
disputes (in 2005, 19,387) involving 350,000 workers (in 2005, 409,819), 
or just over half of the total number of workers involved labor disputes220 
 Many of these disputes result in mass protests.  The number of mass 
protests rose rapidly, from 58,000 in 2003 to over 74,000 in 2004.221  In 
2001, 28.1% of mass protests involved back pay, pension benefits and 
other welfare claims; an additional 9.5% involved decreased payments 
due to SOE restructurings and bankruptcies; and 13.5% involved 
compensations in land takings and relocation cases.222  Such protests, 
 
public order in some cases). 
216 Yu Jianrong, Who Bears the Costs of Intercepting Petitioners?, July 28, 2008, 
(Michael Huang trans.), available at http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp? 
newsid=18648 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
217 Id. 
218 Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, China, 622 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
270, 271-72 (2009). 
219 Shen Li, Renmin Fayuan shen li qun ticxing su song ancjian de kun jing yu dui 
ce—jian lun si fa bao zhang she hui he xie neng li di guo cheng [The Issues and 
Countermeasures in People’s Courts Handling of Multi-party Suits—And the Ability of 
Law to Ensure Social Harmony], available at http://www.a-court.gov.cn/platformData/ 
infoplat/pub/no1court_2802/docs/200601/d_435514.html (last visited May 10, 2009).  
The China Daily reported that over one million cases of illegal seizure of land had been 
uncovered between 1998 and 2005.  Opinion, Fight Illegal Land Seizure, CHINA DAILY, 
April 18, 2006, p. 4, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2006-04/18/content 
_569896.htm (last visited May 10, 2009). 
220 BROWN, supra note 181, at 2. 
221 SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA:  FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 56 (2007). 
222 Liu Xiaomei, Mass Incidents in the Process of Establishing Socialist Harmonious 
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many of them violent, are a threat to social stability, and thus to 
sustained economic growth.  According to the security ministry, over 
1800 police were injured and 23 killed during protests in just the first six 
months of 2005.223 
 The courts have developed a number of techniques to reduce public 
pressure, including breaking the plaintiffs up into smaller groups, 
emphasizing conciliation, and providing a spokesperson to meet with, 
and explain the legal aspects of the case to, the plaintiffs and the media 
in the hopes of encouraging settlement or even withdrawal of the suit.  
Some courts also try to pacify the protesters through legal means, for 
example by providing accelerated procedures to access government 
sponsored funds. 224   Basic-level courts also often work closely with 
higher-level courts and other government entities through the Social 
Stability Maintenance Offices.225 
 In a related move, in 2006, the All China Lawyers Association issued 
guidelines that seek to reach a balance between social order and the 
protection of citizens and their lawyers in exercising their rights.226  The 
guidelines remind lawyers to act in accordance with their professional 
responsibilities.227  Lawyers should encourage parties and witnesses to 
tell the whole truth and not conceal or distort facts; they should avoid 
falsifying evidence; they should refuse manifestly unreasonable demands 
from parties; they should not encourage parties to interfere with the work 
 
Society, ZHONGGUO RENMIN GONGAN DAXUE XUEBAO [J. CHINESE PEOPLE’S PUBLIC 
SECURITY UNIV.], 2005 no.3, at 75, 78. 
223  Attacks on Chinese Police Rising, BBC NEWS, Sep. 28, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4289654.stm (last visited May 10, 2009). 
224 Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom:  State Accommodation of Labor Protest 
in South China (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).  But see Ching Kwan Lee, 
From the Specter of Mao to the Spirit of Law:  Labor Insurgency in China, 31 THEORY 
AND SOC’Y 189 (2002) (arguing that rule of law in China is more of an ideal than a 
reality). 
225 See generally Gu Peidong, Shi lun wo guo she hui zhong fe chang gui xing jiu fen 
di jie jue ji zhi [On the Resolution Mechanism of Irregular Disputes], ZHONGGUO FA XUE 
[CHINA LEGAL SCI.], June 2007, at 3 (giving recommendations to improve dispute 
resolution mechanisms). 
226 See All China Lawyers Association, Guiding Opinion of the All China Lawyers 
Association Regarding Lawyers Handling Cases of a Mass Nature, Mar. 20, 2006 
(Congressional-Executive Commission On China trans., May 30, 2006), available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=53258 (last visited May 
10, 2009) (issuing guidelines for lawyers representing clients in mass actions). 
227 Id. art. I. 
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of government organ agencies; they should accurately represent the facts 
in discussions with the media and refrain from paying journalists to 
cover their side of the story.228  And they should report to and accept the 
supervision of the bar association.229  On the other hand, bar associations 
shall promptly report instances of interference with lawyers lawfully 
carrying out their duties to the authorities, and press the authorities to 
take appropriate measures to uphold the rights of lawyers.230  Where 
necessary, local bar associations may enlist support from the national bar 
association.231 
 More generally, the government has closed down or put pressure on 
some NGOs and law firms that have become too active in pressing for 
change.  Some individual lawyers have been arrested, experienced 
intimidation or had their licenses revoked in the process of representing 
criminal defendants or citizens challenging government decisions to 
requisition their land for development purposes and the amount of 
compensation provided.232  Meanwhile citizens seeking to protect their 
property rights, uphold environmental regulations or challenge 
government actions have been beaten by thugs and gangs, which 
sometimes have been linked to the local government, or even detained 
for their efforts.233 
 
IV. PUBLIC LAW:  ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
 Developments in public law are characterized by:  (i) a manifest shift 
toward legalized, rule-based governance, though with limited 
judicialization, and with “courts continu[ing] to play a complementary 
role to political-administrative mechanisms in dispute resolution and an 
even more limited role in the making of key policies”; 234  (ii) the 
 
228 Id. art. II. 
229 Id. art. III.1. 
230 Id. art. IV. 
231 Id. art. IV.5. 
232 See Fu Hualing, When Lawyers are Prosecuted . . . The Struggle of a Profession 
in Transition, 2 J. COMP. L. 95 (2008) (documenting the revocation of several lawyers’ 
licenses in response to having taken cases of a politically sensitive nature). 
233 CECC 2004, supra note 1, at 93 & 158 n.890. 
234  Randall Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts:  Legalized Governance, 
Judicialization and Dejudicialization in China, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE IN ASIA:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 175, 175-76 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert 
H.Y. Chen eds., 2009).  
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development of a wide range of political-administrative mechanisms and 
channels for handling disputes, including administrative litigation, 
administrative reconsideration, administrative supervision, party 
discipline committees, and the petition system; 235  (iii) despite the 
progress in creating new mechanisms, the limited effectiveness of those 
mechanisms in addressing citizen concerns due less to technical or 
doctrinal issues than to case-dependent systemic socio-political factors; 
(iv) more limited progress in constitutional law, with the constitution 
playing a limited role in dispute resolution.236 
 
A. Administrative Litigation and the Development of Mediation and 
Administrative Reconsideration 
 
 Administrative litigation has been an important symbol of the 
government’s commitment to law-based governance and rule of law.  
The Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) was passed in 1989.237  Since 
then the SPC has issued two interpretations to clarify various issues.238  
 
235 Id. at 181 & 198 nn. 20-26. 
236 ZHENMIN WANG, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL 
PEOPLE’S CONGRESS 2 (n.d.), available at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/ 
Zhenmin%231%23.pdf (last visited May 10, 2009); see Keith Hand, Can Citizens Vitalize 
China’s Constitution?, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 2007, at 15, 18-19 (noting that China has 
yet to develop significant constitutional review, but that it is most likely to occur in 
economic rather than political rights cases).  But see Cai, supra note 115, at 13-16 (noting 
potential for courts to increasingly undertake constitutional review); Michael William 
Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of Constitutional Development:  
The Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1-10 (2002) (arguing that 
China, with an authoritarian regime, has the capability to evolve a true constitutional 
system); Thomas E. Kellogg, Constitutionalism With Chinese Characteristics?  
Constitutional Development and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 215, 216-
18 (2009) (arguing that Chinese courts will be increasingly likely to undertake 
constitutional review). 
237  While officially translated “Administrative Procedure Law,” we prefer the 
translation “Administrative Litigation Law” unless an English-language source provides 
otherwise, as it more closely matches the original Chinese; both translations are used in 
English-language literature.  Administrative Procedure Law (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited 
May 10, 2009).   
238  Interpretation on the Execution of the Administrative Procedure Law 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Mar. 8, 2000, effective Mar. 10, 2000), translated 
in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009) (noting, for example, that only acts authorized by 
the Criminal Procedure Law are excluded from the ALL’s scope).  Zui gao ren min fa 
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Amendments to the law are currently being drafted. 
 The number of annual ALL cases has ranged from 80,000 to 100,000 
over the last decade.239  Determining how often the plaintiff “wins” is 
difficult because about one-third of the cases are settled in other ways, 
such as rejection of the suit or mediation.240  However, even counting all 
such results, as well as all cases where the plaintiff withdrew the suit as 
its own loss, and setting aside all plaintiff victories on appeal or through 
retrial supervision, the plaintiff would have prevailed in 17 to 22% of 
cases between 2001 and 2004.  These success rates stand in sharp 
contrast to success rates in the United States, Taiwan (both 12%), and 
Japan (between 4 and 8%).241 
 Nevertheless, there remain serious problems with administrative 
litigation.  Courts have only limited judicial review power.  They do not 
have the power to review abstract acts (generally applicable 
administrative rules).242  Rather, they may only review specific acts, and 
then only for their legality rather than for their appropriateness.243 
 Moreover, parties may only challenge specific acts that infringe their 
“lawful rights and interests,” 244  which has been interpreted to mean 
personal or property rights.245  Other important rights are thus excluded, 
 
yuan guan yu guan che zhi hang “zhong hua renmin gong he guo xing zheng su song fa” 
ruo gan wen ti de yi jian (shi xing) [On the implementation of the “Administrative 
Litigation Law,” a number of issues (for trial implementation)] (promulgated by the 
Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct. May 19, 1991, effective May 29, 1991), available at 
http://www.gy.yn.gov.cn/Article/flfg/sfjs/xzssf/200605/7957.html (last visited May 10, 
2009). 
239 Pierre F. Landry, Administrative Conflicts in China:  Initiation, Escalation and 
Resolution 4 fig.1 (H.K. Baptist Univ. GIS Working Paper No. 7, 2005). 
240 From 1989 to 1997, the rate at which the court upheld agency decisions dropped 
rapidly from over 50% to around 13%.  Since then, the rate has increased slightly to 15 to 
18%.  The rate at which the court quashes agency decisions in recent years has ranged 
from 12 to 16%.  Since 2000, just over 30% of cases are resolved when either the plaintiff 
withdraws the suit or the suit is withdrawn after the agency changes its decision.  Plaintiff 
withdrawal rates have remained relatively constant for the last 15 years at about 25 to 
30% of all cases.  However, defendant agency withdrawal rates have dropped sharply 
from over 20% between 1995 and 1997 to 5 to 10% between 2001 and 2004.  ZHU, supra 
note 1, at 229-31. 
241 PEERENBOOM, supra note 67, at 400. 
242 Administrative Procedure Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 4, 
1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), art. 12, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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most notably political rights such as the rights to march and to 
demonstrate, freedom of association and assembly, and rights of free 
speech and free publication. 
 The requirement that one’s legitimate rights and interests be 
infringed has also been construed narrowly to prevent those with only 
indirect or tangential interests in an act from bringing suit.  The narrow 
interpretation prevents interest groups or individuals acting as “private 
attorneys general” to use the law to challenge the administration. 
 The main limitations, however, are systemic.  The system for 
funding courts and appointing and promoting judges is undergoing 
reform, and varies by region.  However, many courts still rely on local 
government for funding, and judges are still technically appointed by the 
local people’s congresses after vetting by local party organs.  This 
arrangement has led to difficulties in filing suits, external interference in 
the litigation process, and problems in enforcing judgments against 
administrative defendants.246  In general, administrative litigation is more 
effective in economically developed urban areas than in poorer rural 
areas.  It is more difficult to file cases and prevail in basic level courts in 
less developed areas where the local governments exercise more control 
over the courts. 
 Higher level courts are also less likely to be influenced by pressure 
from local governments.  Not surprisingly, the number of administrative 
litigation cases appealed has risen steadily to almost 30,000 per year, or 
about 30% of all such cases. 247   Plaintiffs prevail, as measured by 
decisions quashed or cases remanded to the lower court, in 
approximately 17% of appellate cases.248  Even after appeal, parties may 
petition for retrial pursuant to a discretionary supervision procedure.  
Success rates, as measured by reversal of the appellate decision or 
remand for retrial, ranged from 27 to 36% between 2002 and 2004.249 
 
Constitutionalism?  The Changing Perspectives of the Chinese Public Law, Dec. 13, 2006, 
available at http://www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=12196 (last visited May 10, 2009). 
246  Wang Qinghua, Zhongguo xingzheng susong: duo zhongxin zhuyi de sifa 
[Chinese Administrative Litigation: Polycentric Adjudication], 19 ZHONGWAI FAXUE 
[PEKING UNIV. L. J.] 513 (2007). 
247 See ZHU, supra note 3, at 236. 
248 Interestingly, this number has declined over the last ten years, as has the success 
rate for appeals in criminal and civil cases, suggesting perhaps that judges in first 
instance cases are becoming more qualified.  Id. 
249 Id. at 242. 
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 All else being equal, cases that involve commercial issues such as 
the denial of a license or imposition of excessive fees are easier for the 
courts to handle than socio-economic cases.  Plaintiffs in the former type 
of case may still run into problems with local protectionism, government 
interference or retaliation.  Such problems might also affect 
administrative litigation cases involving socio-economic issues.  
However, plaintiffs in the latter are also likely to confront all of the 
additional obstacles that arise when courts handle socio-economic cases, 
including conflicting policy goals, central-local tensions, an 
insufficiently developed regulatory framework, and most fundamentally 
lack of resources to provide an adequate remedy. 
 Socio-economic cases affect many parties.  Because the courts are 
unlikely to be able to provide adequate relief, they also have a great 
potential to lead to social disturbances.  Local officials, worried about 
social instability and its affect on their future career prospects, often 
pressure courts not to accept such cases.  Once accepted, judges are often 
pressured to resolve the case through mediation.  Mediation of 
administrative litigation cases has not been allowed under the ALL for 
fear that government officials would intimidate plaintiffs into 
settlement. 250   However, in recent years, mediation of administrative 
litigation cases grew despite the prohibition, and an amendment of the 
ALL is being considered that would permit mediation. 
 Another response to problems in administrative litigation suits has 
been to emphasize administrative reconsideration and other political or 
administrative channels as an alternative.  Unlike in some countries, 
China allows parties to initiate an administrative litigation suit without 
first exhausting administrative remedies, except in a narrow range of 
circumstances.  As noted, recent regulations now require parties to first 
seek administrative reconsideration of the amount of compensation in 
land taking cases before turning to the court.  More generally, the 
government has sought to encourage administrative reconsideration by 
making it more appealing. 
 Administrative reconsideration offers a number of additional 
advantages over litigation under the ALL.  First, it is free.  Second, 
administrative reconsideration bodies, which consist of government 
 
250 Although “the A.L.L. states that administrative cases should not—in principle—
be mediated, in reality they often are, resulting in an abnormal rate of case withdrawals 
once the parties have reached a compromise.”  Landry, supra note 239, at 7. 
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officials of a higher government organ, may consider both the legality 
and appropriateness of administrative decisions.  Third, parties may 
challenge not only the specific act but in some cases the abstract act on 
which it is based.  If the reconsideration body finds the regulation 
inconsistent with higher legislation, it may annul the inconsistent 
regulation or, if it does not have the authority, it may refer the problem to 
the body that has such authority. 
 Administrative reconsideration was permitted by regulations issued 
in 1991.251  However, reconsideration was not popular.  There were only 
240,000 applications for administrative reconsideration from 1991 to 
1998. 252   The government then revised the regulations to encourage 
greater use of the procedure, and upgraded the regulations to a law.253  
As a result, the number of applications for reconsideration has increased.  
In 2004, there were 81,833 applications, of which 72,620 were accepted 
and heard.254   Of those, 64,953 cases were concluded, among which 
37,726 resulted in upholding the administrative agency decision or act 
(58%), compared to 1,741 alterations, 9,527 revocations, 407 
confirmations of illegality, and 557 orders to the agency to discharge 
their legal duties (most likely in cases where agencies had failed to take 
an any action).255  Thus, the plaintiff obtained some form of relief in 
about 19% of the cases accepted for reconsideration. 
 The low success rate would suggest that administrative 
reconsideration would not be an effective way of reducing pressure on 
the courts by screening out potential administrative litigation cases.  
 
251 Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration (promulgated by the St. Council 
Jan. 1, 1991, effective Jan. 1, 1991), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009), 
repealed by Law on Administrative Consideration (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), translated in ISINOLAW (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
252 Office of Legislative Affairs [OLA], Undertaking Administration According to 
Law:  Review and Prognosis, 111th Cong. Rep. on the Asian Development Bank (2008) 
(on file with authors).  
253  Law on Administrative Consideration (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), translated in ISINOLAW (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
254 Fang Jun, Wo guo hang zheng fu yi zhi du de shi shi xian zhuang, wen ti he zhan 
wang (er) [China's Administrative Review System, Problems and Prospects (2)], May 4, 
2007, available at http://www.5izy.cn/articles/h000/h02/1178334701d2793.html (last 
visited May 10, 2009). 
255 Id. 
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However, it appears that many parties give up after losing in 
reconsideration.  In 2002, Shanxi province had 912 administrative 
reconsideration cases, compared to 169 administrative litigation cases, of 
which only 39 (23%) had gone through administrative reconsideration.256  
In 2006, Shandong province had 6,288 administrative reconsideration 
cases, compared to 9,647 administrative litigation cases, of which 1043 
(11%) had gone through administrative reconsideration.257  Thus, in both 
places, the vast majority of parties seeking administrative reconsideration 
did not end up taking their claim to court:  96% in Shanxi, 84% in 
Shandong.  Conversely, in both places, the vast majority of 
administrative litigation plaintiffs proceeded directly to court:  77% in 
Shanxi and 89% in Shandong.  According to some national statistics, of 
the reconsideration cases that do go on to litigation, the court upholds the 
reconsideration decision in three out of four cases.258 
 
B. Constitutional Developments 
 
 Constitutional law has developed at a slower pace than 
administrative law.  Constitutional law, and constitutional litigation in 
particular, serves three broad purposes:  addressing division of power 
issues among state organs; resolving conflicts between the central and 
local government, including inconsistencies between lower level 
regulations and the constitutions; and protecting individual rights. 
 The main role of the constitution to date has been to provide an 
 
256  Legislative Affairs Office of Shanxi Province People’s Government, Shanxi 
sheng zheng fu fa zhi ban gong shi guan yu 2002 nian quan sheng xing zheng fu yi xing 
zheng ying su an jian tong ji qing kuang tong bao [2002 Statistical Report on Shanxi 
Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation Cases], Apr. 17, 2003, 
available at http://www.34law.com/lawfg/law/1797/2397/print_890916242509.shtml 
(last visited May 10, 2009).  
257 Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, 2006 nian Shandong sheng xing 
zheng fu yi xing zheng ying su an jian tong ji fen xi bao gao [2006 Statistical Report on 
Shandong Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation Cases], Aug. 27, 
2007, available at http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/dfxx/dffzxx/sd/200708/ 
20070800026354.shtml (last visited May 10, 2009).  
258 Cun min gao ying sheng zheng fu:  xing zheng fu yi jian cheng qun zhong wei 
quan gan dao [Villagers Beat Provincial Governments:  Administrative Reconsideration 
Has Become the Main Route of Mass’s Rights Protection], BANYUETAN, Mar. 28, 2007, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-03/28/content_5906335.htm (last 
visited May 10, 2009).  
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initial distribution of power among state organs.  Against this 
background legal reforms are negotiated, which frequently affect the 
balance of power among key state actors.  For example, the constitution 
now gives the procuracy the power to supervise the courts.  In recent 
years, the procuracy has interpreted this power to mean that it has the 
authority to supervise final judicial decisions.  As expected, the judiciary 
has argued that the procuracy’s power of supervision should be 
eliminated, or at least limited to general oversight of the court or 
investigation of particular instances of judicial corruption.  According to 
most judges, the procuracy should have no power to supervise individual 
cases.  The courts have also come into conflict with the legislative 
branch over similar powers of individual case supervision and with 
administrative agencies over the power of judicial review of agency 
decisions. 
 In the absence of a constitutional court, however, most issues 
involving the balance of power between state organs, such as whether the 
procuracy and People’s Congress should be able to review court 
decisions, have been left to the political process, with the Party being the 
ultimate arbitrator when the conflicts become too intense or there appears 
to be a deadlock. 
 Constitutional law also provides the basis for addressing conflicts 
between the central government and lower level governments, which is a 
form of principal-agent conflict.  The rapid pace of legislation and an 
incentive structure that rewards local officials for achieving high growth 
rates have led to numerous inconsistencies between lower level 
regulations and higher level laws and the constitution.  Rather than 
relying on the courts to strike down lower level laws that are inconsistent 
with the constitution, the main way for addressing inconsistent 
regulations is through a filing and review system, with the review 
performed by the administrative superior agency.259 
 The 2000 Legislation Law granted citizens and other entities the 
right to propose to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC) that lower regulations were inconsistent with the constitution 
or laws.260  The government has now established a National People’s 
 
259 OLA, supra note 252. 
260 Law on Legislation (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2000), art 90(2), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009); 
Wang, supra note 236, at 4. 
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Congress (NPC) committee to perform this task, and is in the process of 
working out the details of how this mechanism will work in practice.261  
This has provided an opportunity to push for changes to protect citizens’ 
constitutional rights and advance constitutional claims. 
 For example, after Sun Zhigang, a university student from Hubei, 
was beaten to death while detained in a form of administrative detention 
known as Custody and Repatriation, several young scholars filed a 
proposal challenging the legality and constitutionality of the Custody and 
Repatriation Measures. 262   One of the key arguments was that the 
Measures were passed by the State Council.  However, the Legislation 
Law required all restrictions of personal liberty to be based on a law 
passed by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.  
The case was widely reported in the media, and resulted in the State 
Council repealing the Measures, thus avoiding the need for the NPCSC 
to strike down the regulation. 
 In another well-known case, Peking University law professor Gong 
Xiantian published two open letters arguing that the draft Property Law 
violated basic principles of socialism and a constitutional provision 
declaring that state property is inviolable. 263   NPC spokespersons, 
including NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo, issued public statements 
defending the constitutionality of the draft law, and noted that the draft 
had been amended to provide greater protection to state property and 
avoid the fraudulent sale of state assets.264  Although delayed for a year, 
the Property Law was passed in 2007.265 
 It remains to be seen to what extent this new review mechanism will 
empower citizens.  Citizens have submitted at least 37 requests for 
review.266  However the NPCSC has yet to respond formally to a citizen 
proposal for review.  Moreover, although the NPCSC issued two 
circulars setting out detailed procedures for handling proposals for 
 
261 See Wang, supra note 236, at 2 (calling for such a committee). 
262 See generally Keith J. Hand, Using the Law for a Righteous Purpose:  The Sun 
Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China, 
116 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 114, 119-131 (2006) (narrating background of Sun 
Zhigang case). 
263 Hand, supra note 236, at 17. 
264 Id. 
265 Property Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective 
Oct. 1, 2007), translated in ISINOLAW (last visited May 10, 2009). 
266 Id. at 16. 
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NPCSC review of administrative regulations and judicial interpretations, 
these circulars do not provide much transparency into how the decisions 
are actually made. 
 More generally, while the NPCSC review creates a constitutional 
mechanism for dealing with one type of principal-agent problem, 
principal-agent issues—including the problem of inconsistent 
regulations—are for the most part handled through other administrative 
and political mechanisms.  The role of the courts is limited given their 
inability to strike down abstract acts. 
 Constitutional litigation to protect individual rights is only just 
beginning, and future progress is likely to be slow.  In addition to the 
lack of a constitutional review body, the constitution is generally not 
considered to be directly justiciable.  The SPC did rely on the 
constitution in reaching its decision in a civil case involving the right to 
education. 267  However, that case did not involve enforcing the 
constitution against the government.268  The case was also extremely 
controversial, with proponents of expanded constitutional litigation 
drawing hyperbolic comparisons to Marbury v. Madison. 269   Critics 
argued that the decision was at odds with the constitutional structure or 
unnecessary to provide relief in the particular circumstances.270  Since 
then, there have been no cases where a court has cited a constitutional 
right as the sole for basis for its holding (although courts do sometimes 
cite specific constitutional provisions along with other laws and 
regulations to support their decisions). 
 The constitution has, however, been invoked in a series of 
discrimination cases.  In one case that combined the right to education 
with a discrimination claim, three students from Qingdao sued the 
Ministry of Education for its admissions policy that allowed Beijing 
residents to enter universities in Beijing with lower scores than 
applicants from outside Beijing.271  In another case, a person infected 
 
267 See Shen Kui, Is It the Beginning of the Era of the Rule of the Constitution?  
Reinterpreting China’s “First Constitutional Case,” 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 199, 201-
03 (Yuping Liu trans., 2003) (giving facts of the case). 
268 See id. (articulating that the dispute was between private parties). 
269 Id. at 199; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137, 177-79 (1803), asserted 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has the power to exercise judicial review. 
270 Kui, supra note 267, at 212. 
271 Yu Meisun, Cong jiao yubu dang bei gao de liang’an kan zhaosheng zidu chuang 
xing de po jie xing [On the Exigency of Renovating the College Recruiting System, 
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with hepatitis B recently won an administrative litigation suit when he 
was denied a post as a civil servant because of his disease.272  The court 
did not reach the constitutional issues raised in the case, but held that the 
application of the standard on the plaintiff was wrong. 273   Other 
employment discrimination cases have challenged height, gender and age 
restrictions. 
 Rural residents have also appealed to the constitution to protest 
discriminatory treatment.  In one well-known case, three students died in 
a traffic accident.274  In China, compensation hinges on average income, 
which differs significantly between rural and urban areas.275  Thus, the 
families of two of the victims who were urban residents received more 
than twice the compensation of the family of the victim who was a rural 
resident.276  The family of the rural victim brought a lawsuit to challenge 
the discriminatory compensation, arguing the standard violated the 
principle in Article 33 of the constitution that all citizens are equal before 
the law. 277   However, the court held that the compensation was in 
accordance with existing law. 
 Citizens have also drawn on constitutional principles to uphold 
privacy claims.  “In a much publicized case, a Shanxi [sic - Shaanxi] 
couple was awarded damages after police stormed into their bedroom 
while they were watching an adult movie, and a scuffle broke out 
 
Judging From the Two Cases Where the Ministry of Education is the Defendant], DA JI 
YUAN SHI BAO [EPOCH TIMES], Apr. 23, 2004, available at http://www.epochtimes.com/ 
gb/4/4/23/n519496.htm (last visited May 10, 2009).  Another case where a student who 
did not meet the requirements to take the graduate student exam, but was nevertheless 
permitted to do so, was rejected by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences even though 
others who did not meet the minimal score were admitted.  After losing in administrative 
reconsideration and in both the Beijing Intermediate and High People’s Courts, the 
student took his case to the Supreme People’s Court.  Id. 
272 Kellogg, supra note 236, at 234-42. 
273 Id. 
274 Zhao Huanxin, Make Payments 'Fairer':  Legislator, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 14, 2007, 
at 5, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-03/14/content_826874.htm 
(last visited May 10, 2009).  See also Jim Yardley, 3 Deaths in China Reveal Disparity in 
Price of Lives, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/04/14/world/asia/14china.html (last visited May 10, 2009) (providing background 
story of the case). 
275 Zhao, supra note 274. 
276 Yardley, supra note 274. 
277 Does All Life Have the Same Value?, BEIJING REV., May 11, 2006, available at 
http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-19-e/zm-1.htm (last visited May 10, 2009). 
54 EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol 4:1 
 
between the husband and police, resulting in injuries to the husband.”278 
To be sure, most of these cases have been dismissed on technical 
grounds, including lack of jurisdiction, failure to apply to the proper 
court, or the lack of authority to overturn an abstract administrative act. 
 Moreover, in most cases, relief came in the form of a change in the 
laws, not a favorable court judgment, and was the result of a fortuitous 
conflux of circumstances including media attention.  For instance, the 
civil servant hepatitis B case arose after a man in Zhejing, after being 
denied a civil service position because he was a hepatitis B carrier, killed 
a local official and seriously injured another.279  Although the man was 
eventually sentenced to death, his case has attracted much sympathetic 
media attention.280  At the time, a proposal had also been submitted by a 
group of hepatitis carriers to the NPCSC on the discrimination issue.  In 
the wake of these events, several provinces announced that they would 
not exclude non-infectious hepatitis carriers from public employment.281  
And in 2004, the NPC revised the Law on Prevention and Control of 
Infectious Diseases, banning discrimination against the disease 
carriers.282 
 Similarly, the rural resident compensation case arose at a time when 
the Hu-Wen administration was announcing a new policy to create a 
harmonious society and address social injustice, including rising rural-
urban inequality.  After the case, which was again widely reported in the 
press, several provinces adopted a uniform compensation standard for 
urban and rural residents.  SPC president Xiao Yang has also announced 
that the SPC would soon issue an interpretation changing its earlier 
interpretation to provide for a uniform compensation standard. 
 These quasi-constitutional cases generally have involved economic 
issues.  They do not involve political dissidents or the right to free speech.  
 
278 PEERENBOOM, supra note 1 at 118; accord Gang Bian, Porn at Home Leads to 
Red-Hot Privacy Debate, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2002-08/27/content_350757.htm (last visited 
May 10, 2009). 
279 Alice Yan, Hunan Lifts Ban on Hiring Hepatitis B Carriers, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at 6. 
280 See, e.g., id. (giving attention to the case). 
281 See id. (noting that Hunan was the fifth province to lift ban on employing non-
infectious hepatitis B carriers). 
282 Law on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Aug. 28, 2004, effective Dec. 1, 2004), art. 16, 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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Parties who invoke the constitution to criticize the government or call for 
greater democratization have been notably unsuccessful.283  Further, most 
of the successful cases raised discrimination claims.  Discrimination is 
less politically sensitive, and equality claims are easily understood and 
generally supported by the public. 
 Notwithstanding these qualifications, these cases signal an increasing 
willingness on the part of plaintiffs, lawyers and courts to look to the 
constitution as the basis for norms and principles that may be applied in 
particular cases to expand protection of the rights of individuals, subject 
to current doctrinal, jurisdictional and political limitations. 
 
V. EXPLAINING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PATTERNS 
 
 The three most striking patterns from this survey are:  first, the much 
better performance of institutions for handling disputes in urban areas 
compared to rural areas; second, the significantly greater progress in 
handling commercial law disputes compared to socio-economic claims; 
and third, the more advanced state of development of administrative law 
compared to constitutional law. 
 Economic growth largely explains the first pattern.  As is generally 
true everywhere, there is a high correlation between wealth and the 
strength of legal institutions.284  In richer urban areas, there are more and 
better judges, lawyers and law schools.285  Overall, people in urban areas 
have fewer complaints than their counterparts in rural areas.  But when 
they have a dispute, they are more likely to resort to litigation to resolve 
them, and significantly more likely to be satisfied with the result.  In the 
event of mass protests, urban governments are capable of allocating 
funds to pacify some of the disputants. 
 
283 For instance, 
Wang Zechen was sentenced to six years for subversion for attempting to 
establish a Liaoning branch of the banned China Democratic Party, attacking 
the Party as a dictatorship, and advocating the end of the single party system 
and the establishment of a multiparty system with separation of powers.  In 
court, Wang did not contest the facts but argued the acts were legal. 
PEERENBOOM, supra note 1, at 111 (citations omitted). 
284 PEERENBOOM, supra note 1, at 198-99.  See also Kaufmann et al., supra note 26, 
at 76-93 (listing numerical data). 
285 Zhu, supra note 1, at 47-58. 
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 Given the greater importance of commerce in urban areas, there are 
also more commercial disputes.  This leads to a demand for better legal 
institutions and more just and efficient ways of resolving disputes.  The 
government has invested heavily in improving the investment 
environment, including strengthening the various mechanisms for 
commercial dispute resolution, particularly the courts.  The government 
has done so because it relies heavily on economic growth for legitimacy, 
and because continued economic growth is essential if the government is 
going to continue to reduce poverty, improve human development, and 
create a harmonious society.  At the same time, the government has 
ensured that the development of certain areas of commercial law that 
have broad-ranging significance for the national economy and socio-
political stability, such as bankruptcy and competition law, remain 
subject to various political-administrative controls, with a limited role for 
private actors and the courts. 
 The second pattern is also largely explained by levels of wealth, and 
in particular the related problems that lower-income countries such as 
China lack the resources to resolve what are fundamentally economic 
issues, and that existing institutions, particularly courts, lack the means, 
competence and/or independence to provide effective relief. 
 On the other hand, the government cannot simply ignore the 
problems.  The transition to a market economy has led to greater income 
inequality, environmental degradation and social injustice.  People 
nowadays are much more conscience of their rights, and have much 
higher expectations of the government.  When their needs are not 
addressed, they are increasingly likely to take to the streets to protest, or 
to travel to Beijing to beseech central leaders for assistance. 
 The government has responded by adopting policies that attempt to 
reallocate resources to those who have lost out, or not benefited as much, 
from economic reforms; by emphasizing sustainable growth; by re-
emphasizing traditional, non-judicial mechanisms for resolving disputes 
such as mediation, petitions and administrative reconsideration; and by 
developing new mechanisms, such as greater public participation in the 
law-making, interpretation and implementation processes. 
 Yet none of these mechanisms are likely to be adequate in the short 
term.  Accordingly, the government has also increased targeted 
repression to ensure social stability.  This approach generates criticism 
both from liberals, who feel that what is needed is not repression but 
2009] DISPUTE RESOLUTIO; I; CHI;A 57 
 
more rapid liberalization and political reforms, and from conservatives, 
who feel that what is needed is tighter control to maintain law and order, 
and that greater liberalization would plunge China into the kind of chaos 
found in many other developing countries in Asia and elsewhere.286 
 The third pattern of more rapid development of administrative law in 
comparison to constitutional law is explainable primarily by the different 
benefits and risks to the central authorities.  Administrative law is a 
useful means for central authorities to obtain information about, and to 
rein in, local officials.  Regional diversity makes it difficult to design and 
implement national laws in a uniform way.  Many laws are drafted in 
general terms, and allow local officials considerable discretion to pass 
implementing regulations that adapt the national law to local 
circumstances.  In addition, the incentive structure puts pressure on local 
officials to achieve growth and social stability without significant 
support from the central government.  As a result, local governments 
often disregard national laws and policies, creating significant principal-
agent problems.  The various administrative law mechanisms allow the 
government to use citizen complaints to monitor local officials.  Of 
course, the developments in administrative law are also a response to 
citizen and investor demands for more effective governance.  However, 
administrative law mechanisms are most effective when they are used 
against lower level entities on issues that the central government supports, 
rather than when used against the central authorities directly or indirectly 
by raising issues the central authorities deem politically sensitive. 
 Constitutional law developments are more problematic because they 
have the potential to alter the balance of power among state organs and 
challenge the basic principles of the political system.  Nevertheless, the 
constitution has served those inside and outside government as a source 
of empowerment for legal institutions and the development of 
constitutional norms.  In particular, the constitution has played a role in 
establishing broad grounds of legality, accountability and justice, which 
activists and reformers have then drawn on to push for reforms. 
 However, there is currently no constitutional review body.  Even if a 
constitutional review body were to be established with jurisdiction over 
individual rights claims, progress would likely be slow, as it was in 
South Korea and Taiwan prior to democratization.  While the courts 
 
286 See generally Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 1045-47 (describing deep division on 
how to approach administrative detention). 
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might be able to address adequately certain discrimination claims, they 
are likely to be less effective handling civil and political rights, which are 
threatening to the ruling party, or socio-economic cases, for the reasons 
discussed. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Given that many disputes are economic in nature and the problems 
with institutions and mechanisms for resolving disputes are wealth-
related, the government must continue to promote economic growth.  At 
the same time, more resources should be allocated to rural areas to 
strengthen institutions and address underlying problems, thus preventing 
disputes from arising in the first place. 
 Access to justice is a pressing issue.  In April 2007, the State Council 
issued new standards for litigation fees in an effort to provide socially 
vulnerable groups better access to the court system.  Litigation fees in 
some categories will be totally waived while others will be cut in half.  
There are also sporadic reports about courts enforcing judgments in favor 
of socially weak groups.  These developments are largely in response to 
the central government’s call to create a harmonious society and “courts 
for the people.” 
 Although some low income litigants might benefit from the new fee 
standards, the impact on the courts and ultimately on access of justice 
remains unclear.  Many courts, especially rural courts in poor areas, 
cannot afford a decrease in litigation fees, which have been their main 
source of funding.  Some rural courts have thus resisted implementation 
of the new policy, while others have decided to implement the standard 
for one year to see what the affect on court finances will be, and then to 
reevaluate accordingly. 
 The centralization of funding for the judiciary, along with an 
increase of funding especially for poorer rural areas, would go a long 
way toward addressing many of the current problems. But an increase in 
funding alone will not be sufficient.  The efforts to build institutional 
capacity must continue.  The competence of judges needs to be raised 
through training programs and strict adherence to the higher educational 
standards for recruiting judges.  The quality of the legal profession must 
also be improved, particularly in rural areas where there are few lawyers 
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or legal service providers, and even fewer well-trained ones.287 
 Further reductions in judicial corruption are obtainable by:  (i) 
ensuring that the recruitment and promotion of judges is based on merit, 
and that judges are provided continuous on-the-job training; (ii) ensuring 
that the courts are adequately funded, and that judges are paid a 
reasonable salary; (iii) reducing the discretion of judges and court staff 
by reducing barriers to the acceptance of cases, by adopting a case 
management system that assigns cases within a division randomly, and 
by reducing the complexity of pretrial and trial procedures; (iv) 
strengthening the mechanisms for accountability, including more 
prosecutions and heavier punishments of corrupt judges, while at the 
same time ensuring that judges enjoy due process rights and cannot be 
removed from their jobs or denied promotion for whistle-blowing on 
other corrupt judges; (v) making full use of the rules for withdrawal in 
cases of real or perceived conflicts of interest; (vi) enhancing scrutiny of 
judges by civil society, including the establishment of consultative 
committees that include citizen representatives to investigate allegations 
of corruption and conflicts of interest; (vii) increasing transparency 
through publication of judgments; wider and easier access to court 
documents for the public and media; publishing the process for 
nominating, appointing and promoting judges, including selection 
criteria and reasons for appointing or rejecting candidates; and (viii) fully 
enforcing a requirement that judges report their and their immediate 
family members’ income, with the information available to the public 
and media. 
 There is an inherent tension between judicial corruption and judicial 
independence.  Accordingly, increased independence and authority of 
judges should be tied to levels of competence and integrity, beginning 
with judges in higher level courts in urban areas.  There are a number of 
ways in which independence could be strengthened.  Some of them are 
the same as for dealing with judicial corruption:  (i) ensuring that the 
recruitment and promotion of judges is based on merit, and that judges 
are provided continuous on-the-job training; (ii) allowing a greater role 
 
287 See generally Fu Yulin, Status Quo and Development of China’s Rural Grass-
Roots Legal Services:  Viewed From Rural Grass-Roots Legal Services Offices 50 (Oct 
10, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (stating that rural areas have 
lower proportion of qualified legal workers and lawyers due in part to lack of financial 
resources). 
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for higher level courts, the bar association and other legal professionals 
in nomination and appointment process; (iii) ensuring that the courts are 
adequately funded, and that judges are paid an adequate salary; and (iv) 
publishing more judgments with reasoned opinions.  Other ways include:  
(v) ensuring that judges are not fired or removed for deciding cases in 
ways that are politically controversial but in compliance with the law; (vi) 
eliminating or greatly restricting the role of the adjudicative committee, a 
committee of senior judges in each court responsible for deciding 
important or complex cases; (vii) defining more specifically, and making 
more transparent, the role of Party organs with respect to ideological 
guidance for the court, appointments and involvement in particular cases, 
and ensuring that Party policies are transformed into laws and regulations; 
(viii) eliminating or restricting supervision of the courts by the procuracy 
and people’s congresses, and increasing supervision by the media and 
civil society; and (ix) changing the incentive structure for judges so that 
they are not penalized in terms of bonuses or promotions for reversals on 
appeal provided that their decisions were based on a plausible 
interpretation of law rather than ignorance of the law, negligence or 
corruption. 
 Given the wide diversity in China, a varied approach is needed that 
takes into consideration local circumstances, including the nature of 
disputes, people’s expectations and the level of development of the 
economy and institutions.  A highly technical, legalistic solution centered 
on the courts is not always the best approach.  Mediation of some 
disputes may be more appropriate in the countryside, although there 
should be safeguards to ensure that people are not coerced into 
settlement, and that vulnerable parties are not discriminated against in 
the process.  Rural areas in particular might benefit from the 
development of small claims courts. 
 More generally, dispute resolution should be rationalized by 
allocating disputes to effective channels.  Courts should not be required 
to accept socio-economic disputes that they are ill-equipped to handle.  
However, if these disputes are to be channeled to political or 
administrative channels instead, then these mechanisms must be 
improved. 
 One lesson learned from the experiences of global law and 
development projects over the last forty years is that there is no single 
blueprint for reforms.  Countries begin with different traditions and 
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institutional endowments.  Different stages of the development process 
present different challenges, as do different areas of law.  There is 
therefore a need to adopt a pragmatic approach to reforms, to try out new 
methods, and to abandon current practices if they no longer serve their 
purposes.  Much of China’s success to date, whether in the area of 
economics, rule of law, or good governance, is attributable to its 
pragmatic approach. 
